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Stateless in the United States:
Current Reality and a Future
Prediction
Polly J. Price*

ABSTRACT

Statelessness exists in the United States-a fact that
should be of concern to advocates of strict immigration control
as well as those who favor a more welcoming policy. The
predominant reasons for statelessness include the presence of
individuals who are unable to prove their nationality and the
failure of their countries of origin to recognize them as citizens.
Migrants with unclear nationality, already a problem for the
United States, obstruct efforts to control immigration by the
deportation of unauthorized aliens. These existing problems of
national identity will increase exponentially if birthright
citizenship in the United States is amended to exclude the
children of undocumented aliens. Contrary to common
assumptions, proposed changes to U.S. citizenship law would
exacerbate statelessness into the next generation when no
fallback nationality is available.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, there are an unknown number of
persons whom no nation will claim as citizens or nationals. Unless
the United States apprehends and attempts to deport these persons,
the public is unlikely to know about them, and they are likely to
continue to live in the shadows-undocumented both from the
perspective of U.S. immigration law and with respect to their
countries of origin.' The attempt to control unauthorized immigration
by deporting migrants brings this statelessness to light because no
country will take them. There are thousands of persons that the
United States has been unable to deport in the last several years
alone. 2 Many others are also likely to be effectively stateless, given
that 12 million unauthorized migrants are thought to be living in the
United States today.3
The harm of statelessness, as described below, is significant both
to the individual and to the United States. But at present this
statelessness at least is limited to one generation, because under
existing practices of territorial birthright citizenship, the children of

1.
In this Article, I sometimes refer to the class of noncitizens in the United
States who lack legal immigration status as "undocumented aliens." This use of the
term is not equivalent to "stateless," although as I explain in this Article, an unknown
number of undocumented aliens in the United States are effectively stateless.
2.
See infra text accompanying notes 190-222 (evidencing the difficulty the
United States has faced in deporting migrants).
3.
This estimate is based on the Pew Hispanic Center's 2007 study, concluding
that as many as 12.5 million undocumented aliens were then in the United States. In
2008, the estimate was 11.2 million. See Julia Preston, Decline Seen in Numbers of
People Here Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/
us/31immig.html? _r=1&partner=rssnyt (reviewing a report by the Center for
Immigration Studies, which argued the decline in immigration was due to increased
enforcement efforts).
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unauthorized immigrants are automatically awarded U.S. citizenship
at birth if born in the United States. 4
The incidence of statelessness would be exacerbated
exponentially if the lack of nationality continues into subsequent
generations. Proposals to amend the rule of territorial birthright
citizenship in the United States-the jus soli-aim to deny
citizenship to the children of persons who are in the country illegally.
Citizenship for these children would instead follow the jus sanguinis,
meaning citizenship by descent from a parent.5 These children would
then, like their parents, be subject to "control" through deportation.
The proposals rest on the assumption that the children of illegal
migrants would retain the nationality of their parents, and thus
would not present problems of statelessness. But as this Article will
demonstrate, some children born in the United States would in fact
be stateless, with no recognized nationality at birth. This is true even
though the great majority of undocumented persons in the United
States themselves come from jus soli nations with ius sanguinis
traditions governing births outside of the country.6
The prediction that restrictions on birthright citizenship in the
United States could lead to statelessness has been acknowledged in
some of the academic literature on this subject.7 But there is as yet no

4.
Birthright citizenship comes from the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Birthright citizenship in
the United States is discussed infra Part III.A.
5.
The award of citizenship at birth, either by jus soli or jus sanguinis,
accounts for the citizenship of ninety-seven out of every hundred people in the world.
See Ayelet Shachar, The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 367, 368 (2007) (analyzing the distributive-justice ramifications of
citizenship entitlement through birthright).
6.
Based on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates, the vast
majority of undocumented immigrants are from Mexico and Latin America: 60 percent
(6.7 million) from Mexico, 12 percent (1.3 million) from Central America, 5 percent
(575,000) from South America, and 3 percent (350,000) from the Caribbean. MICHAEL
HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION
RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, at 4 (2010), available at

These
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois illpe 2009.pdf.
statistics are provided at the end of this Article in the Appendix.
7.
See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 183-87 (1996) (discussing the
mutuality of obligation between those who must obey the laws of the United States and
those whom the U.S. government must protect); PETER H. SHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH,
CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 136-37

(1985) (arguing that citizenship by birth is inconsistent with the American concept of
consent for membership and thus membership by birth should be constrained); ROGERS
M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 470-72
(1997) (viewing U.S. history as hierarchies aimed to minimize racial, ethnic, and
gender minorities).
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full explanation of why statelessness would occur. This Article
documents the various ways in which statelessness already occurs in
the United States, and it also explains in detail why statelessness
will increase under a limited jus soli.
Unauthorized immigration is perceived as a major social,
economic, and political issue in the United States. Restrictions on
U.S. birthright citizenship are among the many proposed and ongoing
efforts to deal with unauthorized immigration. Statelessness, already
present in the United States, would be increased by these restrictions
because (1) statelessness already exists in the Western Hemisphere,
from which many, if not most, unauthorized migrants come to the
United States, and (2) new restrictions will extend statelessness to
second or subsequent generations, as well as create statelessness for
some children even when the parent has a recognized nationality.
The United States would create a new class of persons who cannot be
deported, thereby frustrating the primary objective of restrictions on
birthright citizenship.
This Article also fills a void in previous scholarship by showing
where and why statelessness already exists in the Western
Hemisphere (including the United States). It is widely recognized
that differences in how nations award citizenship at birth can lead to
statelessness, and that statelessness of some magnitude probably
exists in every country in the world. The pure form of jus soli in
theory minimizes statelessness because the location of one's birth is
generally easier to prove than is the nationality of one's parents (and
often the nationality of a parent of a parent). Thus, the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961 Convention)
favors jus soli by stipulating that an important measure to avoid
statelessness at birth is to provide nationality to children born in the
territory who would otherwise be stateless. 8
The comparative perspective provided here also serves an
important function. Relatively stable national boundaries and
governments should produce no statelessness on the basis of conflictof-nationality laws for migrations of persons within the Western
Hemisphere (from one jus soli birth nation to another). The fact that
effective statelessness is an existing problem in parts of the Americas
is noteworthy in its own right, but it is particularly significant when
considering proposed modifications to existing rules awarding
citizenship at birth in the United States.
This Article proceeds as follows. Following a background section
on the concept of statelessness, it evaluates the causes and
prevalence of statelessness already existing in the United States and

8.
See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, 1 1, Aug. 30, 1961,
989 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1961 Convention] ("A Contracting State shall grant its
nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.").
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other parts of the Western Hemisphere. It proceeds to show how
statelessness would increase if the United States should alter its
birthright citizenship rules, using the Birthright Citizenship Act of
2013 as an example for this proposed change. In its latter sections,
this Article explains the mechanisms that would create statelessness
for children and why statelessness is an undesirable result both for
the individuals involved and for the United States.

II. THE PRESENT PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS

A. Statelessnessas an InternationalSociopolitical Concern
Stateless is a term used in international legal instruments to
denote individuals and populations with no enforceable assertion of a
nationality.9 Whether someone is stateless ultimately depends on the
viewpoint of the state with respect to the individual or group of
individuals.' 0 Identifying stateless persons can prove difficult." An
estimated 12 million persons are believed to be stateless throughout
the world.12 But the State Department warns that because the data
are unreliable, it is impossible to know whether those numbers are
growing or shrinking.' 3
The problem of statelessness has been substantial enough to
attract international attention since at least 1954. Two international
conventions constitute the primary framework for definitions of and

9.
See generally U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], THE STATE OF
THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: A HUMANITARIAN AGENDA ch. 6 (1997), available at
http://www.unher.org/3eb7ba7d4.pdf (defining a stateless individual as someone "who
is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law").
10.
See generally Alison Harvey, Statelessness: The 'de facto' Statelessness
Debate, 24 J. IMMIGR. ASYLUM & NATIONALITY L. 257, 259 (2010) (demonstrating the
need to create a new way to describe individuals who are not stateless, but also not
entitled to all the rights of citizenship, rather than using the term de facto stateless
given the confusion it has introduced into the statelessness debate).
11.
As explained by Refugees International: "Some stateless persons may be
registered as foreigners, non-national residents, or be categorized as nationals of
another state, even in instances where the other state does not consider them as
nationals and will not protect them. . . . Questions about nationality and citizenship
also arise for children of migrant workers." KATHERINE SOUTHWICK & M. LYNCH,
REFUGEES INT'L, NATIONALITY RIGHTS FOR ALL: A PROGRESS REPORT AND GLOBAL
SURVEY ON STATELESSNESS 2 (2009), available at http://www.refintl.org/sites/default/
files/RI%20Stateless%20ReportFINAL_031109.pdf.
12.
See Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 76 (2011)
(suggesting the issue of statelessness is one of extreme, international importance
today, and that a cooperative international network could be a viable solution).
13.
See Samuel M. Witten & David J. Kramer, Imagine This: You Have No
Country, No Country Will Claim You, DIPNOTE: U.S. DEP'T ST. OFFICIAL BLOG (Sept.
16, 2008, 8:30 AM), http:/Iblogs.state.gov/index.php/entries/no-country/ (stating that
due to the limited data regarding the stateless, few trends can be delineated, but the
State Department is adding the issue to annual country reports to increase awareness).
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responses to statelessness: the 1954 Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons (1954 Convention), and the 1961
Convention. 14 In addition, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the
Child obligates signatory states to ensure that every child acquires a
nationality.15 Several regional human rights treaties also address
statelessness, including the American Convention on Human
Rights.16 The American Convention, which the United States signed
in 1977 but has never ratified, states: "Every person has the right to
the nationality of the state in whose territory he was born if he does
not have the right to any other nationality."' 7
The 1954 Convention set out a definition of statelessness and
listed a number of rights that stateless persons should have. Among
other obligations under the 1954 Convention, contracting states must
treat stateless persons the same as lawful aliens in that country,
including access to wage-earning employment, housing, public
education, and public relief.' 8 Upon request, contracting states are
also obligated to issue travel and identity documents to stateless

14.
See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954,
360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter 1954 Convention] (seeking to expand the coverage of the
term stateless individual as it was defined in 1951); see also Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (providing that a party to
the convention must offer stateless individuals citizenship if the individual was born in
its territory and would be stateless otherwise); UNHCR, TEXT OF THE 1961
CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF STATELESSNESS WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY
THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 3-5 (2011),
available at www.unhcr.org/3bbb286d8.html (offering an introduction laying out the
points of the Convention).
15.
An earlier document, the Convention to Reduce the Number of Cases of
Statelessness (concluded in 1973), provided that a child must be granted his or her
mother's nationality if the child would otherwise be stateless. This convention has only
nine member states. See Anna Dolidze, Lampedusa and Beyond: Recognition,
Implementation, and Justiciability of Stateless Persons' Rights Under International
Law, 6 INTERDISCIPLINARY J. HUM. RTS. L. 123, 131-32 (2011-2012) (examining the
Convention's impact on children).
See UNHCR, Address Before the Comm. on Juridical & Political Affairs,
16.
Org. of Am. States: The Inter-American System and International Protection for
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Returnees, and Internally Displaced, Stateless and Other
Persons of Concern to UNHCR: Themes of Common Interest, at 1-2, OAS Doc. No.
CP/CAJP-1912/02 (noting "the Americas have been fertile ground for the adoption and
development of creative and innovative regional humanitarian responses for treatment
of refugees and other persons requiring protection").
See American Convention on Human Rights art. 20, § 2, Nov. 22, 1969,
17.
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (asserting that the right to nationality is
universal and birthright is one way to obtain it). For a discussion of some reasons why
the United States has not ratified this document, see Mark Kirk, Should the United
States Ratify the American Convention on Human Rights?, 14 REVISTA IIDH 65, 78-79
(1991), http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publicallibrev/rev/iidhlcont/14/dtr/dtr4.pdf.
See 1954 Convention, supra note 14, arts. 8, 17, 21-24 (governing wage
18.
earning, housing, public education, and public relief under the Convention).

2013/

STA TELESS IN THE UNITED STA TES

449

persons within their territory.1 9 Further, stateless persons are not to
be expelled except on "grounds of national security or public order." 20
The 1961 Convention attempted to strengthen international
intervention to reduce statelessness, including a UN mandate. Among
other provisions, the 1961 Convention specifies the circumstances in
which contracting states should award legal status to stateless
persons, including granting citizenship to persons born within their
borders who would otherwise be stateless. 2 '
A related international agreement is the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees. 22 Designed to protect persons fleeing
persecution in their own countries, the Convention defines persons
needing protection as well as the responsibilities of the states to
which they have fled. 23 The Convention recognizes that while some
refugees may not have a nationality, all bona fide asylum seekers are
effectively stateless if they cannot return to the country of their
nationality. 24 Refugees have a right not to be expelled or punished for
illegal entry into the territory of a contracting state, as well as the
right to be issued identity and travel documents. 25 The United States
signed the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967, and
later enacted legislation incorporating its key provisions. 26 In the

19.
See id. art. 28 (governing travel documents under the Convention).
20.
See id. art. 31 (governing expulsion under the Convention).
21.
See 1961 Convention, supra note 8 (agreeing that citizenship shall be given
at birth or through an application submitted to appropriate authorities).
22.
See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of NonRefoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and Its 1967 Protocol 2 (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.unher.org/refworld/docid/
45fl7ala4.html [hereinafter UNHCR Advisory Opinion] (addressing application of the
1951 Convention principle of non-refoulement to extraterritorial cases).
23.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967
Protocol, defines refugee as
[a person who,] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, § A(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm.
24.
See UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 22, at 3 (noting the application
of the Convention to both the stateless and any individual who cannot return to the
country of his or her nationality).
25.
See id. at 4 (listing rights made available through the 1951 Convention).
26.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a), tit. 1, Pub. L. 101-132, 66
Stat. 163, 166 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)) (adopting
the 1951 Convention's definition of refugee); Ritu Ghai, Deciphering Motive:
EstablishingSexual Orientationas the "One Central Reason" for Prosecution in Asylum
Claims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 521, 530 (2012) (arguing Congress intended for
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United States, persons who are granted asylum may eventually
become U.S. citizens. 27
Stateless persons fall into one of two formal categories: "de jure"
defines those "not considered as a national by any state under the
operation of its law,"28 and "de facto" describes persons outside the
country of their nationality who are denied diplomatic protection or
assistance by that country.2 9 The 1961 Convention provides for
international protection for de jure stateless persons, but it also
recommends that persons who are de facto stateless should be
protected as well, to enable them to acquire an effective nationality. 30
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a
UN agency, is the designated organization to investigate the status of
persons who may be stateless and to assist those persons in making
claims to the relevant government authorities.31 The UNHCR charge
also includes "a global mandate for the identification, prevention and
reduction of statelessness and for the international protection of
stateless persons."3 2
De facto statelessness has also been used to describe persons
unable to document or prove nationality and those whom a
government does not recognize as citizens despite a colorable claim to
the statute's definition to be interpreted similarly to the Convention's definition of
refugee).
See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
27.
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 814 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing how asylees "have a

routine mechanism for adjusting to permanent resident status after one year in the
United States" and how "they are not precluded from adjusting their status if they
otherwise qualify, such as through marriage or employment").
1954 Convention, supra note 14, art. 1, T 1. Brad Blitz and Maureen Lynch
28.
explain:
Under international law, de facto stateless persons are not covered by the
provisions of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
even though it includes a non-binding recommendation that calls upon states to
"consider sympathetically" the possibility of according de facto stateless persons
the treatment which the Convention offers to de jure stateless people.
Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch, Statelessness: The Global Problem, Relevant
Literature, and Research Rationale, in STATELESSNESS AND THE BENEFITS OF
CITIZENSHIP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 4, 5 (Brad K. Blitz & Maureen Lynch eds., 2009),

available at http://www.udhr60.ch/report/statelessness-paper0609.pdf.
29.
See What Is Statelessness?, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/
49c3646cl58.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (stating that although there is no
universally accepted definition for the term, it is traditionally used to refer to someone
who is "denied diplomatic and consular protection or assistance of his/her country").
See SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 11, at 1 (pointing to the Final Act of
30.
the 1961 Convention's recommendation to treat de facto stateless individuals as de jure
for purposes of acquiring nationality).
See DIV. OF INT'L PROT., UNCHR, UNHCR ACTION To ADDRESS
31.
STATELESSNESS: A STRATEGY NOTE 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.unher.org/
refworld/docid/4b9e0c3d2.html (explaining UNHCR's mandate for resolving the plight
of the stateless).
Id.
32.
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that status.3 3 The 2010 Expert Meeting on the Concept of Stateless
Persons at Prato, Italy, further refined the meaning of statelessness
in functional terms: an individual is stateless "if all states to which he
or she has a factual link fail to consider the person as a national." 34
No formal process determines that an individual is de facto stateless.
Rather, it is an ad hoc classification applicable when an individual is
either unable to prove his citizenship, or his country of origin refuses
to recognize his citizenship.
The definitions of statelessness in the two international
conventions have been widely recognized as deficient in recognizing
the full scope of the problem.3 5 Moreover, relatively few nations are
parties to the conventions, leading some commentators to despair of a
concerted international effort to address a problem of "significant
magnitude and severe consequence." 36 By contrast, every UN member
nation-with the exception of the United States and Somalia-has
signed on to and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, signifying widespread agreement with its mandate that every
child has a right to a nationality at birth.3 7
While this Article focuses on the Western Hemisphere, the
phenomenon is and has been worldwide. Recent examples of
statelessness across the. globe include children born in Thailand
whose mothers entered the country illegally,3 8 similar problems in

33.
In international law, the terms nationality and citizenship are often used
interchangeably; I also employ them as equivalents in this Article. See SOUTHWICK &
LYNCH, supra note 11, at 1 (explaining that both terms are used to define membership
by states).
34.
Laura Bingham, Julia Harrington Reddy & Sebastian Kohn, De Jure
Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary Conclusions, OPEN Soc'Y
FOUNDS.
4
(2011),
http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/prato-statelessness20110303.pdf.
35.
See LAURA VAN WAAS, NATIONALITY MATTERS: STATELESSNESS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAw 19-27 (2008) (explaining certain deficiencies found in the 1954
and 1961 Conventions).
36.
Id. at 27. The number of parties to the 1954 Convention is seventy-six,
while the number of parties to the 1961 Convention is fifty. See Convention Relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons: Status, UNITED

NATIONS TREATY

COLLECTION,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=V-3&chapt
er=5&lang=en (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); see also Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness: Status, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,

http://treaties.un.org/

Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg-no=V-4&chapter=5&lang=en
(last visited Feb. 20,
2013).
37.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3, (providing that children will have the right to a name and "the right to
acquire a nationality"); see also Convention on the Rights of the Child: Status, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
38.
See Milbrandt, supra note 12, at 78-79 (finding that many children born in
hospitals or villages were not given identification papers).
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other countries in Southeast Asia,39 and the Roma in Europe, many of
whom are stateless because some EU member states deny them
citizenship. 40 In both of these examples, statelessness occurs because
citizenship is not awarded at birth under jus soli principles. The
solution stipulated in the 1961 Convention is that "[a] Contracting
State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who
would otherwise be stateless," 41 a principle that advocates for the
Roma say is being ignored. 42 Other instances of statelessness involve
displaced refugees. For example, UNHCR believes that Greece is at
risk of a "humanitarian crisis" due to the large number of migrants
denied asylum, leaving them with no effective nationality. 43 Migrants
in Greece have come from Africa and Asia, and a large population
came from Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of
communist regimes. 44
The United States maintains a paradoxical and complex stance
with respect to statelessness. The nation is not a signatory to either
the 1954 or the 1961 conventions on statelessness. One reason given
for the United States' refusal to join the 1961 Convention is that it
"limits voluntary renunciation of nationality in ways that would
conflict with the right to voluntary expatriation that is recognized
under U.S. law." 45 Americans may renounce their nationality, even if

39.
See generally Alec Paxton, Finding a Country To Call Home: A Framework
for Evaluating Legislation To Reduce Statelessness in Southeast Asia, 21 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 623 (2012) (offering recommendations for legislation seeking to end
statelessness based on the success experienced by various South Asia enactments).
40.

See generally STATELESSNESS

IN THE

EUROPEAN

UNION:

DISPLACED,

UNDOCUMENTED, UNWANTED (Caroline Sawyer & Brad K. Blitz eds., 2011) (providing
comparative accounts of stateless individuals whose populations are either de facto or
de jure stateless); Dolidze, supra note 15, at 131-32 (describing treaties that
specifically aim to prevent statelessness in children); Jessica Parra, Stateless Roma in
the European Union: Reconciling the Doctrine of Sovereignty Concerning Nationality
Laws with InternationalAgreements To Reduce and Avoid Statelessness, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1666, 1667 (2011) (finding the Roma to be a marginalized minority due to EU
citizenship laws).
41.
1961 Convention, supra note 8.
42.
See Parra, supra note 40, at 1676 ("Many of the parties that have signed
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, still have laws and practices
that ignore the recognition of the right to a nationality.").
43.
See Sharita Gruberg, De Facto Statelessness Among Undocumented
Migrants in Greece, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 533, 533-34 (2011) (analyzing the
dire circumstances of those who seek asylum in Greece due to the current legal regime
and demonstrating the need for a "functioning asylum system").
44.
See Greece: Facts and Figures, INT'L ORG. MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/
cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/europaleuropean-economic-area/greece.htm
(last updated Sept. 2012) (offering an overview of migration activities involving
Greece).
45.
Eric P. Schwartz, Recognizing Statelessness, DIPNOTE: U.S. DEP'T ST.
OFFICIAL
BLOG
(Sept.
8,
2011),
http:/Iblogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/
recognizing-statelessness.
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that renunciation would lead to statelessness. 46 The 1961
Convention, by contrast, prohibits even the voluntary renunciation of
citizenship when it would result in statelessness. 47
The United States nonetheless agrees in principle that
statelessness is undesirable, and it pursues diplomatic efforts around
the globe to remedy statelessness. It is also the single largest donor to
the UN agency tasked with protecting stateless individuals. 48
According to a State Department publication, "[t]he U.S. government
cares about statelessness as an issue that carries repercussions for
regional stability and economic development," among other reasons. 49
Furthermore, "[t]hrough diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, the
US Department of State has sought to elevate statelessness as an
important human rights and humanitarian issue in the US foreign
policy agenda. The US is committed to continued support for stateless
populations."5 0 The State Department is here focused outside of the
United States, not internally.
Within the United States, the State Department takes the
position that no one in the country is stateless due to U.S. action or
failure to act; all stateless persons here (to the extent they exist,
according to the government) owe their status to other nations. Two
State Department officials recently maintained that "the US does not
contribute to the problem of statelessness, and US law does not treat
stateless individuals differently from other aliens."5 1 In other words,
and as further detailed below, stateless individuals currently living in
the United States became stateless through the actions of other
nations. As this Article later argues, that picture changes radically if
citizenship is no longer automatic at birth within one of the fifty
states. The source of statelessness would then be the United States.
Linda K. Kerber has provided historical examples of
statelessness in the United States in her provocative essay, Toward a

History of Statelessness in America.52 Beginning with slavery and

ending with Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan and
held as an enemy combatant, Kerber notes a cyclical interest in
problems of statelessness in this country. Kerber urges an expanded
understanding of statelessness, positing that statelessness can
increase either with or without civil upheaval:

46.
See Nicole Green & Todd Pierce, Combating Statelessness: A Government
Perspective, 32 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 34, 35 (2009) (explaining the United States'
failure to ratify the 1961 Convention).
47.
See id. (summarizing the Convention's stance on voluntary renunciation of
citizenship).
48.
Id.
49.
Id. at 34.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 35.
52.
See Linda K. Kerber, Toward a History of Statelessness in America, 57 AM.
Q. 727, 730-31 (2005).
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Today, once again, statelessness matters. With the end of the cold
war and fall of the Berlin Wall; with the people made refugees by war
in the Balkans, Rwanda, and the Sudan; with the fragility of
citizenship in entities like Palestine, increasing numbers of people lack
secure citizenship. . . . But citizenship ties can be fractured in stasis as
well as in movement; liminal people who have not moved physically
sometimes find that state boundaries have shifted, and the protections
53
that citizenship were thought to provide suddenly evaporate.

For Kerber, "[t]o historicize statelessness is to write a history of the
practices of race, gender, labor, and ideology, a history of extreme
otherness and extreme danger." 54
The notion of citizenship as a human right subject to the
domestic choices of nations is admittedly problematic, and it has been
the subject of much recent debate.5 5 As it is often stated, "Nationality
is a fundamental human right and a foundation of identity, dignity,
justice, peace, and security." 56 The link between the ability to possess
rights and one's nationality began as early as the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration set out for the first
time in the international arena a list of fundamental human rights to
be universally protected, as a reaction to the upheaval of World War
II. The Declaration states that everyone has a right to a nationality,
as well as the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality.5 7
The choice of whom to admit within national borders, and whether to
make those persons citizens, remains one of domestic law. The U.S.
Supreme Court has long upheld this view, stating in 1892 that "[i]t is
an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation
has the power . .. to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases, and upon such

53.
54.

Id. at 728-29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 731.

55.

See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND

CITIZENS 19 (2004) (arguing that migration and the policy and constitutional issues
that arise when people move across state borders are important in developing theories
of justice); LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 96 (2008) (examining the interplay of the inward and the
boundary-conscious perspectives on citizenship); DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS
BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP 73-74 (1997) (suggesting

traditional meanings of citizenship have been overshadowed by international law);
Gerald L. Neuman, The Resilience of Nationality, 101 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 97, 9799 (2007) (noting that international restrictions on excluding individuals from
nationality reinforce its important nature); Diane F. Orentlicher, Citizenship and
National Identity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 296, 296 (David
Wippman ed., 1998) (studying exclusionary laws in certain nations and the
international responses to those laws); Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of
Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 694-97 (2011) (reviewing literature and discussing
the emergence of "international citizenship law").
56.
SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 11, at i.
57.
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15,
U.N. Doc. AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (defining a common standard of nationality to
be achieved for all people).
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conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."58 As one scholar put it,
"Citizenship is not only an instrument of closure, a prerequisite for
the enjoyment of certain rights, or for participation in certain types of
interaction. It is also an object of closure, a status to which access is
restricted."5 9
There also seems to be a contradiction by design in a scheme that
posits an affirmative right to citizenship when no nation has an
affirmative obligation to grant or recognize it. But Peter Spiro, among
others, sees the recent emergence of an international law of
citizenship with "broad implications for the nature of the state."6 0
This international law of citizenship is necessary (if not inevitable),
according to Spiro, because the long-term consequences of "situating
citizenship practice in the realm of human rights" may be "to
diminish the value of citizenship."6'
As a concrete matter today, stateless individuals are said to lack
the protection that nationality provides. Linda Bosniak poses the
issue this way:
Most talk about citizenship has concerned two questions: Who is
entitled to enjoy citizenship, and what does citizenship entail for its
holders? The debate has focused, in other words, on defining the class of
citizenship's subjects and on elaborating the meaning of citizenship in
substantive terms. . . . Yet most analysts have tended to ignore another
set of questions that are fundamental to citizenship. These are
questions concerning citizenship's location-that is, questions about
where citizenship takes place and where it should take place. The
reason these questions have largely been disregarded is that citizenship
has been conventionally assumed to be a national enterprise; it has
been assumed to be an institution or a set of social practices situated
squarely and necessarily within the political community of the nationstate. 6 2

This brief overview of statelessness is designed to introduce the
topic for further discussion in specific contexts. In Part.III.C, the
author will turn to the issue of whether and to what extent
statelessness is harmful in the United States.
B. Statelessness in the Western Hemisphere
A striking feature of citizenship practices in the Americas is the
near uniformity of primary reliance on jus soli. The "New World" is
comparatively generous in the provision of citizenship to persons born

58.

Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).

59.

ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AS SOCIAL CLOSURE 31 (1992).

60.

Spiro, supra note 55, at 696.

61.

Id.

62.
Linda Bosniak, Denationalizing Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 237, 237 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
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within national boundaries, including the children of undocumented
persons and temporary visitors. 6 3 Indeed, "[T]he jus soli principle has
64
primarily become a Western Hemisphere tradition." Yet jus soli
only prevents statelessness where it is accompanied by meticulous
and generally recognized documentation. It is a false sense of security
to believe that jus soli regimes do not produce stateless persons;
effective statelessness can exist in any nation.
As this subpart relates, widespread failures to register existing
citizens, displacement due to civil conflict and migration, and
discrimination against indigenous groups and others have resulted in
a substantial number of persons in the Americas who are effectively
stateless. By comparison, the author will also note instances in which
even U.S. citizens have had difficulty proving their citizenship,
resulting in actual deportations of the country's own citizens. The
statelessness that exists throughout the Americas constitutes one
source of statelessness in the United States.
Evidentiary issues become the centerpiece of disputes about the
nationality of individuals, especially with respect to the practical
problems presented by persons who lack documentation or the means
to obtain it. Additional rigor with respect to these issues will better
inform ongoing debates about statelessness. The evidentiary issues
that already occur throughout the Americas, and the potential
relationship of those to United States immigration and citizenship
policy, merit an extended examination in the following subpart.
1.

De Jure Statelessness in the Americas

As a general rule, de jure statelessness in the Western
Hemisphere is thought to be uncommon, in large part because
individuals predominantly migrate into jus soli regimes from
countries that also recognize citizenship status for most births
occurring outside the nation. In theory, at least, a colorable claim of
citizenship as a matter of law would normally exist for most of the
population.
The notable exception is the Dominican Republic, which recently
65
changed from a jus soli regime to jus sanguinis. "Hundreds of

As noted in a recent study, "In practice, nationality policies built on the
63.
principle of blood origin (jus sanguinis)rather than birth on the territory (us soli) have
made the incorporation of minorities, especially children of migrants, particularly
difficult." Blitz & Lynch, supra note 28, at 8.
Amitai Etzioni, Citizenship Tests: A Comparative, Communitarian
64.
Perspective, 78 POL. Q. 353, 353 (2007).
See Katherine Culliton-Gonzalez, Born in the Americas: Birthright
65.
Citizenship and Human Rights, 25 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 127, 129 (2012) (discussing the
Dominican Republic's legislative and constitutional efforts to switch to a jus sanguinis
system); see also Richard T. Middleton, IV & Sheridan Wigginton, A Comparative
Analysis of How the Framing of the Jus Soli Doctrine Affects Immigrant Inclusion into
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thousands" of stateless persons are believed to reside there as a result
of discriminatory birth registration practices against persons of
Haitian descent. 66 The Dominican Republic for many years awarded
citizenship to those born in its territory, with the exception of
children of diplomats and those "in transit" through the country.67
Dominican government officials in recent years routinely refused to
register births of persons of Haitian descent, usually on the ground
that Haitian migrants in the country were "in transit," even if they
were long-term residents. 68 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights ruled in 2005 that the Dominican Republic's denial of
nationality through its refusal to issue birth certificates violated that
country's own constitution. 6 9 The Senate of the Dominican Republic
issued a resolution rejecting the judgment, followed shortly by a
decision of the country's Supreme Court upholding the previous
interpretation that undocumented migrants should be considered as
being "in transit."7 0 In July 2009, the Dominican Constitution was
amended to introduce the principle of jus sanguinis for births to
parents who are in the country illegally.7 1
According to the State Department, the Dominican government
currently asserts that even children born of Haitian parents who
were legal permanent residents in the Dominican Republic cannot be
registered as Dominican nationals, allegedly because the Haitian
Constitution extends citizenship to those children and simultaneously
prohibits dual nationality. 72 Prior to the Haitian earthquake in 2010,
the Dominican government estimated that up to 1.2 million
undocumented migrants resided in the country, the overwhelming
majority being of Haitian descent. 73 An additional 200,000 were

a National Identity, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 521, 521 (2012) (comparing U.S.
and Dominican Republic citizenship practices).
66.
Stacie Kosinski, Note, State of Uncertainty: Citizenship, Statelessness and
Discrimination in the Dominican Republic, 32 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 377, 383
(2009) (quoting Phillipe LeClerc of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees).
67.
See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA DE 2002 art. 11
(awarding citizenship to all persons who were born in the territory of the Republic,
except for the legitimate children of foreign diplomats residing in the country or
foreigners who are in transit).
68.
See Kosinski, supra note 66, at 383 (describing how the Dominican
Republic neglects to register births of people of Haitian descent).
69.
Yean & Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 130, 141 (Sept. 8, 2005).
70.
See Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic: Racial Discrimination in
Access to Nationality, OPEN Soc'Y FOUNDS. (July 1, 2009), http://www.soros.org/
litigationlyean-and-bosico-v-dominican-republic
(providing a
timeline of the
implementation of the Yean & Bosico Girls judgment).

71.

Id.

72.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
18 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160162.pdf.

73.

Id.
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thought to have entered the country illegally following the
earthquake in Haiti. 74
Thousands of Dominican-born persons of Haitian descent lack
citizenship or identity documents. As the State Department reported
in 2010:
Government officials continued to take strong measures against
citizenship for persons of Haitian descent, including retroactive
cancellation of birth and identity documents, many pertaining to
persons of Haitian descent. The government stated that such
cancellations were based on evidence of fraudulent documentation, but
advocacy groups alleged that the revocations targeted persons whose
parents were Haitian or whose names sounded Haitian and that the
number of revocations was in the thousands. As of March the Central
Electoral Board (JCE) had provisionally revoked the birth certificates
and cedulas [national identity cards] of 126 children born to Haitian
migrants and their children. Some of the births had been recorded
75
decades ago, with several from the early 1970s.

The State Department characterizes these persons as "functionally
stateless," adopting the favored modern terminology while avoiding
the de facto and de jure categorizations from the earlier round of
76
conventions related to nationality.
In addition, de jure statelessness can occur in other ways. A
migrant in the Americas can lose his or her nationality without
gaining another through the operation of citizenship rules that limit
the duration or geographic reach of citizenship. These rules include
(1) termination of citizenship for emigrants after a period of residency
outside of the home country; (2) requirements that extraterritorial
births be registered to affirm children's citizenship; and (3) onerous
77
proof requirements for registration of a birth to an unwed parent.
The latter two pathways can be compensated for if a child acquires
the citizenship of the birth country. Because all of these avenues of
potential statelessness are relevant to the United States, they are
discussed in more detail in Part III below.
2.

De Facto Statelessness in the Americas

(a) Latin America
Academic inquiry with respect to citizenship in Latin America
has tended to focus on equality, participatory democracy, and access
to government services, rather than acquisition of citizenship status

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III for examples.
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or proof thereof.7 8 As a result, outside of the Dominican Republic,
statelessness in the Western Hemisphere has drawn little attention,
necessitating reliance on government and human rights groups'
reports. These instances of statelessness are predominantly de facto
rather than de jure, resulting when individuals lack any
documentation to prove the location of their birth, or when they have
sought refuge in another country and cannot return to their own.
Documentation especially poses a problem for migrant workers and
persons displaced by civil conflict. It is also potentially significant for
future migrations, including migration patterns affecting the United
States.
Large numbers of persons displaced by civil conflicts potentially
face functional statelessness. Several nations in Latin America have
encountered significant numbers of refugees fleeing civil conflicts in
Colombia and elsewhere.79 Some seek regularization of their status
by refugee applications in host countries, but many do not. In Brazil,
for example, 17,500 unregistered Colombian refugees were thought to
be living in the country's Amazon region, in addition to the nearly
4,000 recognized refugees in Brazil.8 0 In addition, nearly 4,000
Haitian immigrants searching for employment entered the country in
2011, entering Brazil via Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia.8 1
The number of asylum and refugee claims recognized by Brazil
and other countries lags behind the number of applicants, sometimes
in substantial numbers. In Bolivia, for example, UNHCR reported in
2008 a recognized refugee population of more than 600 persons that

78.
See, e.g., DEBORAH J. YASHAR, CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS AND THE POSTLIBERAL CHALLENGE 3 (2005)

(arguing that Latin American academicians "increasingly find demands for the
recognition of group rights and ethnic self-determination"). See generally CITIZENSHIP
IN LATIN AMERICA (Joseph S. Tulchin & Meg Ruthenburg

eds., 2007) (collecting

scholarly articles on conceptions of citizenship, democracy, and active citizenship in
Latin America).
79.

While Latin America is a region with long-standing regional conventions

and codified systems for refugees and asylum, due to overwhelming numbers and
limited government resources, scholars have noted "the inadequacy of the InterAmerican system of asylum to respond-both conceptually and practically-to the
challenges of contemporary refugee flows." Roberto Cuellar et al., Refugee and Related
Developments in Latin America: ChallengesAhead, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 482, 482-83

(1991).
80.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BRAZIL (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119150.htm
(discussing
protection of refugees in Brazil as of 2009). In July 2009, Brazil enacted an amnesty for
approximately 43,000 persons in the country illegally, with the largest group of
beneficiaries being an estimated 17,000 Bolivians, "many of whom benefitted from
regularized status to leave exploitive labor conditions." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BRAZIL 19 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/160156.pdf.
81.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BRAZIL 14 (2012),

available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186707.pdf.
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was "steadily increasing."8 2 But in 2008, the government completed
processing and agreed to provide refugee protection in only thirty
pending cases, with thirty-five older cases still under review and new
applications yet to be considered.83 To the extent these refugees have
no proof of citizenship from their country of origin or cannot return to
it, they are effectively stateless.
Ecuador and Costa Rica present even starker numbers. The
Ecuadorian government received nearly 8,000 applications for refugee
status in the first nine months of 2008 alone, adding to a backlog of
several thousand pending cases.84 Both UNHCR and the Ecuadorian
government reported difficulty in dealing with the number of
applications. These lags may well result from existing bureaucracies
being overwhelmed by applicants. But by failing to grant asylum or
refugee status, there may also be an unacknowledged purpose among
states to avoid acquiring large numbers of people who need to be
looked after.
In 2011, UNHCR estimated that there were over 55,000
recognized refugees in Ecuador.8 5 As of 2008, an additional 133,000
persons were "in need of international protection," 92 percent of who
were thought to be Colombians.8 6 According to several NGOs, despite
being required to by law, "the Civil Registry did not always cooperate
in registering refugee children or registering children of refugees born
in the country."8 7 Many of these refugees fled their homes without
proof of nationality, if they had those documents at all. Some
minority and native groups may go without citizenship
documentation because they are not familiar with it, cannot acquire
it, do not think they need it, or because they cannot afford it.
As of 2009, UNHCR also reported 11,900 recognized refugees in
Costa Rica, the majority of whom were from Colombia.88 The large
influx led to the creation of a separate office within the General
Directorate of Immigration to address refugee issues, but the low
recognition rates for refugee status led UNHCR to estimate that
there were at least 500 additional "persons of concern" in need of

82.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BOLIVIA (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/jl/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119149.htm.
83.
Id.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR (2009),
84.
[hereinafter
available at http://www.state.gov/j/dr/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119158.htm
2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR].
85.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR 14 (2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/drl/rlshrrpt/humanrightsreportlindex.htm?dlid=186512
[hereinafter 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR].
86.
2008 HuMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR, supranote 84.
87.
2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ECUADOR, supra note 85, at 6.
88.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136107.htm
[hereinafter
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA].
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international protection.8 9 UNHCR also undertook a campaign in
Costa Rica to "counter the incorrect perception of Colombian refugees
as narcotics traffickers, criminals, or members of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia."90 As of 2011, the refugee recognition rate
continued to be low. Both the Costa Rican government and UNHCR
reported that many of these applicants were using the asylum
request process to obtain documentation to allow them to transit the
country as part of an overall goal to reach the United States.9'
UNHCR has classified rejected asylum seekers in Costa Rica as
"persons of concern."9 2
The turmoil in Colombia has resulted in an estimated more than
5 million internally displaced persons within that nation's borders
since 1985.93 This estimate greatly exceeds the government's
registered number of 3.9 million due to the high number of
indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups affected by displacement. 94
These groups disproportionately lack access to citizenship documents.
Further, Colombia is one of the rare jus sanguinis nations in the
Western Hemisphere, complicating the determination of who is a
citizen of Colombia.95 At least one parent must be a citizen or a legal
resident of Colombia in order for a child to be considered a citizen at
birth.9 6 Thus, many persons born in Colombia are not citizens of that
country, and may in fact be stateless.
Panama also has dealt with a large influx of refugees from
Colombia. The State Department expressed concern about the lack of
an accurate number of those cases, as well as arbitrary detention and
deportation of refugees by border officials who did not have a clear
understanding of their responsibilities.9 7 Moreover, asylum seekers
and refugees were not provided with documentation in a timely

89.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA 9 (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160159.pdf [hereinafter 2010
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA].
90.
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA, supra note 88.
91.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA 4 (2012),
availableat http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186503.
92.
See id. ("[The UNHCR had to consider an increasing number of rejected
asylum seekers as 'persons of concern' in need of international protection.").
93.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COLOMBIA 10 (2012),
availableat http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreportlindex.htm?dlid=186502.
94.
Id.
95.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE WORLD 53
(2001), available at http://www.multiplecitizenship.com/documents/IS-O1.pdf (listing
citizenships laws in countries around the world, including Colombia).
96.
See id. (explaining that "[b]irth within the territory of Colombia does not
automatically confer citizenship").
97.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PANAMA 5 (2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreportlindex.htm?dlid=
186531 [hereinafter 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PANAMA] (explaining how this 'lack
of clarity resulted in arbitrary detention and placed asylum seekers at an increased
risk of return to countries where their lives or freedom could be threatened").
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fashion, according to the State Department report.9 8 And even when
they were, "these documents were not always recognized as valid by
public officials."99 UNHCR also classified as "persons of concern" an
estimated 15,000 in Panama who were believed to need international
protection, including persons denied refugee status and those who did
not apply because they feared deportation from Panama, apparently a
well-founded fear.10 0
Persons displaced by earlier conflicts in the region have also
become long-term residents outside of their country of birth, with
unclear status. In Nicaragua, for example, some 6,000 Salvadorans
who had lived in the country since the civil wars of the 1980s gained
legal status only in 2008.101 That new law also waived fines on
persons who had been in the country illegally and offered a one-year
period to regularize status.1 02 However, by 2010, although a detention
center was established in Managua for refugees during case
processing, the center was underfunded and had capacity for only
thirty refugees. 0 3 Many other refugees were held in regular jails.1 04
Nicaragua granted -refugee status to only a small number of the many
pending applicants.105 Among UNHCR's concerns is the possibility
that some refugees are being expelled at the border.106
Even where civil strife is not a problem, widespread failure to
register births poses a significant problem of effective statelessness.
For example, several hundred thousand persons in Bolivia lack
citizenship documents, preventing them from obtaining international

98.
See id. (indicating that case review was delayed due to language barrier
and potential discrimination).
99.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PANAMA 5 (2011),
availableat http://www.state.gov/j/drlIrls/hrrpt/201O/wha/154514.htm.
100.
2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PANAMA, supra note 97, at 13. In 2011, 899
displaced persons and 685 of their dependents in Temporary Humanitarian Protection
status were located in designated locations administered by the National Office for the
Protection of Refugees. These individuals were not allowed to exit these zones without
a permit, most of whom were of Afro-Colombian heritage and included some citizens
born in Panama as a result of marriages between displaced Colombians and
Panamanian citizens. Id.
101.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119167.htm
[hereinafter
2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA].
102.
Id.
103.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA 16-17
(2011),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160471.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA].
104.
See id. (discussing the small capacity of Nicaragua's refugee detention
center).
105.
See id. at 17 ("According to a January UNHCR survey, the government
granted refugee status to 120 persons.").
106.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136120.htm (indicating that
only 1 percent of Honduran refugee-status seekers actually stayed in Nicaragua).
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travel documents and accessing other government services. 07
Persons born in Nicaragua have difficulty obtaining documentation of
that fact, especially in rural areas. According to the 2008 Human
Rights Report for Nicaragua, the local civil registries should register
births within twelve months, upon the presentation of either a
medical or baptismal certificate. 08 But one estimate indicated that
250,000 children and adolescents in Nicaragua lacked legal
documentation as of 2008.109
Persons without a registered birth are unable to obtain a cedula
in Nicaragua. As the 2008 Human Rights Report for Nicaragua
explains, these persons
had difficulties participating in the legal economy, conducting bank
transactions, or voting. Persons who lacked a cedula also were subject
to other restrictions in employment, access to courts, and land
ownership. Women and children lacking citizenship documents were
reportedly more vulnerable to sexual exploitation by traffickers. The
government did not effectively implement laws and policies to provide
persons the opportunity to obtain nationality documents on a
110
nondiscriminatory basis.

The Report further notes that the Nicaraguan government "did not
effectively implement laws and policies to provide citizens living
outside the country access to citizenship documents on a
nondiscriminatory basis.""' Apart from equality of treatment and
access to citizenship within Nicaragua, migrants outside of the
country face problems proving that they are Nicaraguan citizens.
Recent data suggest the registration problem may grow worse.
One 2010 estimate showed that more than 460,000 Nicaraguan
citizens lacked cedulas. 112 In 2011, approximately 12.5 percent of the
eligible population was thought to lack proof of citizenship."' The
government also raised the cost of a cedula (including renewal of an
expired card) to approximately fourteen dollars, when almost half of
its citizens live on less than one dollar per day.114
Haiti's weak administrative civil registry and consular systems
make obtaining documentation
extremely difficult, thereby
compounding the risk of statelessness for Haitians both in Haiti and

107.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BOLIVIA 14 (2011),

available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/wha/154495.htm.
108.

2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA, supra note 101.

109.
110.

Id.
Id.

111.
112.

Id.
See 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA,

supra note

103, at 17

(examining a recent poll released by M&R Consultants).
113.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA 6 (2012),

available
at
dlid=186529.
114.

http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rlsfhrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?

2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: NICARAGUA, supra note 103, at 17.
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abroad. In 2011, the State Department identified two groups at the
greatest risk of statelessness: undocumented Haitians abroad who
were unable to acquire documentation and the children of Haitian
migrants born abroad in countries with jus soli policies that faced the
risk of having their second citizenship revoked.115
Migration may also be a cause of failure to register a birth. Costa
Rica is one nation experiencing migration from Nicaragua, as its
stable government and strong economy draw migrant workers from
throughout the Central American region. The State Department has
for several years identified problems of statelessness in the border
areas Costa Rica shares with Panama and Nicaragua, including this
example:
Members of the Ngobe-Bugle indigenous group from Panama came to
work on Costa Rican plantations, and sometimes their children were
born in rudimentary structures on the plantations. In these cases the
children were not registered as Costa Rican citizens because the
families did not think it necessary to register the births, but when the
families returned to Panama, the children were not registered there
either.

116

The parents themselves may not have proof of citizenship. A
significant hurdle may be to convince these indigenous groups that
registration is necessary, especially when fees are required.
A similar problem occurred with other Nicaraguan families who
migrated to work on Costa Rican coffee plantations. According to the
Report, "The [Costa Rican] government attempted to advise the
migrant population to register at birth all children born in the
country." 1 7 There is no indication that these births have since been
registered in either Costa Rica or Nicaragua.
Peru has also experienced problems documenting births. In 2008,
more than one million citizens lacked identity documents and thus
could not fully exercise their civil, political, and economic rights as
citizens.118 According to a State Department report, "[a]n estimated
15 percent of births were unregistered." 1 9 As of 2011, an estimated
4.7 million Peruvians lacked citizenship documents.120 Without
citizenship documents, these individuals are heavily marginalized

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI 7-8 (2012),
115.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?
at
available
dlid=186522.
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA, supra note 88.
116.
Id; accord 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: COSTA RICA, supra note 89, at 9
117.
(reporting same).
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PERU (2009), available
118.
at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119170.htm.
Id.
119.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PERU 6 (2012),
120.
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=
186536.
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both economically and politically.' 2 1 A recent report states that
"[ploor and indigenous women and children in rural areas were
disproportionately represented among those lacking identity
documents" due to the absence of a birth certificate.122
In other instances, efforts to provide birth certificates for
children of migrants or displaced persons appear to have been more
successful. In Panama, for example, the State Department noted a
"sustained and successful effort to provide birth certificates to the
Panamanian-born children of 542 displaced Colombians," meaning
these children were recognized as citizens of Panama.123 On the other
hand, the report notes that in remote areas of the country some
parents did not register their children at birth, resulting in
"difficulties when later seeking to obtain a birth certificate." 2 4
In Mexico, although there are no official governmental statistics,
nongovernmental organizations estimate that up to 30 percent of the
children in Mexico remain unregistered,125 with one group estimating
the total number of unregistered persons at more than 10 million.1 26
Street children, children from single-parent homes in rural areas,
indigenous children, children of internally displaced persons or
refugees, and unauthorized migrants and minorities unsurprisingly
tend to have -the highest percentages of unregistered children.127
Without registration, access to education, health insurance, and legal
protection is denied to these children.12 8 When the children grow up,
the lack of citizenship or identity documents prevent them from
entering the formal labor market, obtaining a driver's license or voter
registration documents, opening bank accounts, marrying legally, or
even registering the births of their own children.12 9 This problem
becomes compounded when the unregistered travel to the United

121.

Id.

122.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PERU 18 (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160473.pdf [hereinafter 2010
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PERU].
123.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PANAMA (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119168.htm.
124.
Id.
125.
Karen Mercado Asencio, The Under-Registration of Births in Mexico:
Consequences for Children,Adults, and Migrant, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Apr. 2012),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=888.
126.
Be.Foundation. Derecho a la Identidad, BEFOUNDATION 1, http://www.befoundation.org/befoundation/BE%20FOUNDATION%2OEnglish%20version.pdf
(citing
Child Rights Information Network).
127.
See Mercado Asencio, supra note 125 (explaining how the "[u]nderregistration of births in Mexico mainly affects marginalized sectors of the population").
128.
See id. (highlighting the damaging effects of under-registration on these
already-vulnerable populations).
129.
Id.
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States and become "doubly undocumented."13 0 Once in the United
States, they are ineligible for a Mexican matricula consular or U.S.
identification.13 1 In effect, they are invisible to both the United States
and Mexico.1 32
The citizenship documentation issues identified by the State
Department likely underreport the scope of the problem throughout
the region. Worldwide, an estimated 40 million births go unregistered
each year.13 3 Furthermore, the instances of functional or effective
statelessness are problematic beyond the borders of any single nation.
Interregional migration within Latin America, apart from migrations
provoked by civil disorder or natural disaster, is a significant
phenomenon, with Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica among the
important destinations.134
Economic and other migration has led to increased concern about
human rights abuses coinciding with enhanced efforts at border
control. For example, a group of undocumented migrants sued in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights over the country's alleged
violent expulsion of them.' 35 Forty-six Nicaraguans had been
captured and immediately deported from Costa Rica because they
lacked documents.' 3 6 Some of the Nicaraguans alleged that they had
been beaten.' 3 7 The court held that the undocumented migrants could
pursue their claims for the beatings, as well as for their forcible
removal, purportedly in violation of Costa Rican law.' 3 8
However, in most instances, countries view the migrant workers
as necessary, especially in agriculture work. Other economic
migration examples include the following:
Bolivians migrating to work in the sugar and tobacco industries of
northern Argentina; Paraguayans going to subtropical estates in
northeast Argentina for horticultural work; Peruvians moving back and
forth to harvest bananas and mangos in Ecuador; Nicaraguan peasants

See id. (describing the trend of "'doubly-undocumented' immigrants in the
130.
United States," who due to unregistered birth in Mexico, also cannot prove citizenship
in Mexico).
Id.
131.
See id. (noting that "doubly-undocumented" immigrants would likely be
132.
completely left out of comprehensive immigration reform since they cannot prove their
identity).
UNICEF, UNICEF on Deficient Birth Registrationin Developing Countries,
133.
24 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 659, 662 (1998).
See Jorge Durand & Douglas S. Massey, New World Orders: Continuities
134.
and Changes in Latin American Migration,630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 20,
27 (2010) ("[W]ithin the region, Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica became important
destinations for those from neighboring countries.").
135.
Guner Espinales v. Costa Rica, Case 11.529, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 37/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. 1 6 (2000), available at
http://www.wfrt.org/humanrts/cases/37-01.html.
Id. 1 2.
136.
Id. 6.
137.
Id. $$ 53-54.
138.
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and Panamanian Ngobe Indians traveling to the annual coffee harvest
in Costa Rica; Guatemalans migrating seasonally to coffee farms in
Chiapas, Mexico; Colombians working on farms in Venezuela's Zulia
and Andes provinces; Dominicans going to harvest coffee and sugar
cane in Puerto Rico; and Haitians migrating to cut sugar cane and
harvest coffee in the Dominican Republic. 1 3 9

In sum, for a variety of reasons, a significant but unknown
number of persons residing in Latin America possess uncertain
nationality. These reasons include widespread failures to register
existing citizens at birth, the difficulty migrants face in obtaining
proof of citizenship, the inability of displaced persons to return to
their country of origin, and civil disorders that overwhelm another
country's ability to process claims for asylum and refugee status.
These problems have immediate consequences for the United States
due to the presence of illegal entrants from these countries. The
Appendix of this Article is a chart with estimates of the countries of
birth of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States,
with Latin American nations predominating.140
b.

The United States

Although failure to register births is not common in the United
States, it does happen. In 2011, for example, two sisters in Kentucky
sued in federal court over eligibility for Social Security, resulting in a
settlement in which the sisters were issued documentation by the
State Department to establish their citizenship. 141 One sister was
born at a home in Kentucky, and the other was delivered in the back
of a van in Alabama. 142 The births were recorded in a family bible but
were otherwise not documented.143 Proof of citizenship for Social
Security benefits, in fact, constitutes a fertile area of litigation, with
the two Kentucky sisters serving as just one example.
The case of Sazar Dent provides another example of the
problems that can result from a missing or nonexistent birth
certificate. Dent was nearly deported to Honduras in 2010 because he
could not prove the citizenship of his U.S.-born adoptive mother with
a birth certificate, a key fact for establishing his own derivative U.S.

139.
Durand & Massey, supra note 134, at 29 (citations omitted).
140.
It is worth noting that until 1968, persons from the Western Hemisphere
enjoyed unrestricted immigration into the United States. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra
note 27, at 21.
141.
See Brett Barrouquere, Sisters Settle Suit over Social Security Cards,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2011),
http://seattletimes.com/html/politics/
2016834567_apusnosocialsecuritynumber.html (reporting that, after a DNA test, the
judge ordered issuance of social security cards).
Id.
142.
Id.
143.
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citizenship.144 Dent's statement to the Immigration Judge (IJ) noted
the absence of his mother's birth certificate: "I believe I inherited U.S.
citizenship through this adoption, now I seem to meet all of the I.N.S.
requirements for qualifying for it, exept [sic] for her birth certificate,
because she was born in 1904 and records started being kept on files
only since 1911."145 The IJ ruled against Dent, and in Dent's first
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), he asked for
assistance obtaining government records related to his mother's
citizenship "because he was in jail and his adoptive mother was
dead."14 6
The Ninth Circuit's decision turned on the government's failure
to provide Dent with information it had concerning his mother's
citizenship and her application for citizenship for Dent. The court
wrote:
The IJ and the government had focused the case, at that point, on
whether Dent's Kansan adoptive mother was a United States citizen, a
question to which the government may have already had the answer.
(The adoption lawyer had suggested in the letter furnished to the BIA,
that her 1950 application for a social security number, providing her
date and place of birth, should be sufficient to establish her
14 7
citizenship.)

Dent was ultimately successful on his claim to be a naturalized
citizen based upon his adoptive mother's U.S. birth.148
Birth certificates, however, are susceptible to fraud, and a black
market in birth documents exists in the United States.149 Most
knowledge of fraudulent birth documents is derived from cases of
passport fraud, in which a false birth record is used in an attempt to
acquire U.S. citizenship. In 2001, Usama S. Abdel Whab, a citizen of
Egypt, applied for a U.S. passport, stating that he was born in

See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 369-70 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting the
144.
immigration judge's order of removal after finding that Dent's failure to produce his
mother's birth certificate, despite ample evidence of her citizenship, constituted a
failure to make out a prima facie case).
145.
Id. at 369.
146.
Id. at 372.
147.
Id. at 373.
148.
Id.
149.
A related identity fraud involves U.S. driver's licenses. The Bush
administration's Real ID program aimed to make state driver's licenses into de facto
national identity cards. See DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS AS
SURVEILLANCE 133 (2009) ("[The Real ID system for enhancing drivers'
licenses . . . may also be seen as a de facto national identification system."). Recent
news reports have chronicled the ease with which even the enhanced security
measures of the Real ID program may be forged. See John McAuliff, Overseas Forgers'
Fake IDs Can Fool Even the Experts, USA TODAY (June 10, 2012),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-08/overseas-fake-ids-fool-experts/
55479636/1 (describing the technological sophistication of foreign-produced false
identification documents).
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Brooklyn. 50 In support of this claim, Whab submitted false affidavits
from persons supposedly with knowledge of his birth in Brooklyn. 15 '
When asked for additional supporting documents, Whab submitted a
forged baptismal certificate.152 Whab was convicted of making a false
statement in an application for a U.S. passport and deported. 5 3
A passport applicant must establish both personal identity and
U.S. citizenship. As Whab's case indicates, the absence of a birth
certificate is not necessarily fatal to obtaining a U.S. passport, since
one can submit other (nonfraudulent) proof of birth in the United
States. If an individual is unable to produce a birth certificate, he
must produce, among other things, proof that no official birth
certificate exists. 154 The applicant may also submit "birth affidavits"
from persons with knowledge of the birth, "such as the doctor
performing the birth or a relative who personally witnessed the
birth."15 5 But as Sazar Dent's case makes clear, the passage of time
can make that proof extremely difficult-both to produce and to
verify.
Government officials must show that a potential deportee is
eligible for deportation-i.e., that he or she is not a U.S. citizen but
rather an alien-by "clear and convincing evidence."156 In practice
before immigration courts, one wonders how often this standard
becomes a summary showing by the government, with the burden
shifting back to the alleged noncitizen to provide affirmative proof.
And in expedited removal proceedings, there is at best only a very
limited opportunity to prove U.S. citizenship if the Customs and
Border Patrol agent believes otherwise. 5 7
Indeed, lack of proof of citizenship is the key factor in some
mistaken deportations by the U.S. government of its own citizens.s5 8

150.
Abdel-Whab v. Orthopedic Ass'n of Dutchess, 415 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-96
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (forged baptismal certificate).
151.
Id. at 295.
152.

Id.

153.
154.

Id. at 294 n.1, 295, 302.
Id. at 296.

155.

Id.

156.
See generally Agosto v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 436 U.S. 748
(1978) (discussing standard for judicial review of nationality claim).
157.
Judicial review through habeas corpus is possible (but unlikely without
representation by counsel) for persons subject to expedited removal who claim to be
U.S. citizens. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 235(b)(1)(C), ch. 4, 66 Stat. 163,
198 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (2006)) (prescribing the
limitations on administrative review); id. § 242(e)(2) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(2) (2006)) (prescribing the limitations on judicial review). For an overview of
the expedited review process, see ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 569-75.
158.
See Lurdes C. da Silva, Deportationof U.S. Citizens: "It'sJust the Tip of the
Iceberg,"
DETENTION
WATCH
NETWORK
(Mar.
13,
2008),
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/1188
(providing several anecdotes of
individuals deported due to lack of proof of U.S. citizenship); Jacqueline Stevens, U.S.
Citizens Detained and Deported: 2010 Fact Sheet, STS. WITHOUT NATIONS (July 15,
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In 2010, as many as 4,000 U.S. citizens were detained or deported as
aliens.15 9 The total since 2003 exceeds 20,000 according to Jacqueline
Stevens in her article, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and
Deporting U.S. Citizens as Aliens.160 Immigration control laws
mandating detention and deportation for hundreds of thousands,
without attorneys or, in many cases, without administrative
hearings, are largely to blame.16 1
In a report entitled Hundreds of U.S. Citizens Wrongfully
Deported Each Year, CNN researchers uncovered the story of Howen
Francis, who was deported to Jamaica at the conclusion of a jail
sentence for assault.162 He told immigration authorities that he was a
U.S. citizen since he was born in this country, but he did not have
access to a birth certificate or to an attorney to help him prove it.163
In another instance, a fifteen-year-old girl from Texas, Jakadrien
Turner, was deported to Colombia after running away from home and
being arrested for shoplifting. 164 Colombian officials returned her to
U.S. officials after her family located a birth certificate, proving her
U.S. citizenship. 6 5 The Colombian government expressed dismay
that it had issued her a passport, at the behest of U.S. immigration
officials, on the basis of what they termed "inaccurate and
unrealistic" statements. 166
Stevens also relates the sad tale of Mark Lyttle, born in North
Carolina and therefore a U.S. citizen.167 Because immigration agents
did not believe Lyttle was who he claimed to be, Lyttle was deported
to Mexico with only a prison outfit.168 When Lyttle attempted to
http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2010/07/us-citizens-detained-and2010),
deported-2010.html (describing evidence that violations by DHS inhibit the ability of
those with potential claims of U.S. citizenship to present proof of these claims in
removal proceedings); Marisa Taylor, Feds Admit Mistakenly Jailing Citizens as Illegal
Immigrants, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2008, at A8 (describing the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) admission before a congressional subcommittee that U.S.
citizens had been mistakenly detained).
Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting
159.
U.S. Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 606, 608 (2011).
160.
Id.
161.
Id. at 608-09.
See Lisa DiVirgilio, Report: Hundreds of U.S. Citizens Wrongfully Deported
162.
Every Year, SYRACUSE.COM (July 26, 2010, 9:52 AM), http://www.syracuse.com/news/
index.ssf/2010/07/report hundredsof us citizens.htm (describing how Francis's story
is part of a potentially larger trend of deportations of U.S. citizens).

163.

Id.

164.
U.S. Teen Deported by Mistake Returns Home, SKY NEWS (Jan. 7, 2012,
http://news.sky.comlstory/915969/us-teen-deported-by-mistake-returnsPM),
3:58
home.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
See Stevens, supra note 159, at 674-76 (describing how Lyttle was
167.
repeatedly thwarted in his efforts to prove his U.S. citizenship before finally being
allowed to return home).
Id. at 674.
168.
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return to the United States, Customs and Border Patrol agents
denied him entry on the ground that he was "in their records" as a
deported alien. 169 When he tried again to enter the United States, he
was threatened with prison by immigration authorities for falsely
representing himself as a U.S. citizen. 170 Lyttle spent nearly five
months outside the country in shelters, immigration camps, and a
jail. 171 Later, he obtained a U.S. passport with the help of a consular
officer.1 72 Even with this passport, Lyttle was denied entry at the
Atlanta airport, but the intervention of a pro bono attorney prevented
his once again being flown back to Mexico. 73 Lyttle narrowly avoided
being rendered stateless permanently due to his inability to convince
the U.S. government of his American citizenship.
These examples of proof issues that arise with respect to U.S.
citizenship are meant to illustrate that even in the United States it is
sometimes difficult to prove one's citizenship or the location of one's
birth.174 As noted previously, elsewhere in the Americas, proof of
nationality presents a much more pervasive problem. These instances
illustrate the many evidentiary problems associated with proof of
citizenship even with the United States' comparatively well-organized
systems for recording births.
While the U.S. citizens whose stories are discussed above are not
technically "stateless," there exists an unknown but substantial
number of persons born elsewhere who are stateless in this country.
It is difficult to find estimates of the number of stateless persons now
living in the United States. The Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada, however, cited a 2005 report by Refugees International that
"several thousand . .. individuals held in U.S. immigration detention
facilities are believed to be stateless." 7 5 While reports of the

169.
Id. at 675.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id. at 675-76.
173.
Id. at 676.
174.
Proof of derivative U.S. citizenship-whereby minor children automatically
become U.S. citizens upon the naturalization of a parent-is particularly problematic.
In June 2012, the blog "States Without Nations" and others reported the lengthy
detention by immigration authorities of twenty-six-year-old Jhon Erik Ocampo, despite
his claims that he acquired U.S. citizenship automatically by operation of law in 2002
when his mother naturalized. Jacqueline Stevens, ICE Kidnaps Another US Citizen in
Springfield,
Illinois,
STS.
WITHOUT
NATIONS
(June
21,
2012),
http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2012/06/ice-kidnaps-another-us-citizenin.html. Ocampo, taken in handcuffs and shackles, spent time in two jails while ICE
agents investigated his claim. Id.
175.
Immigration & Refugee Bd. of Can., United States: The Treatment of
Stateless Persons Living in the United States with No Legal Status; Whether They Are
Subject to Detention by Immigration Authorities, and if So, Whether Such Detentions
Can Be Challenged Through the Courts;the Rights of Such Individuals if They Are Not
in Detention, Such as the Right To Work; Whether There Is a Mechanism To Provide
Legal Rights to Stateless Persons When the US Has No Place To Deport Them; Whether
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existence of these persons remain anecdotal, the recent experience of
Mikhail Sebastian provides one illustration.176 An ethnic Armenian
born in what is today Azerbaijan, Sebastian arrived legally in the
77
United States in 1996 with a Soviet Union (USSR) passport.' With
his USSR passport no longer having legal effect, Sebastian was
refused a passport by Azerbaijan. 178 Sebastian continued to live in
the United States under a special arrangement with the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), but without citizenship of any
country.' 79 In 2012, he traveled to American Samoa-a U.S.
territory-and subsequently was denied reentry into the United
States on the ground that he had "self-deported."180 American Samoa
may become his permanent new home.
While it is impossible to know the total number of persons who
are effectively stateless, the number of persons whom the United
States is unable to deport shows the existence of a U.S. population of
stateless migrants. Deportation from the United States requires the
agreement of the recipient country to accept the person, along with
issuance of travel documents by that country prior to deportation.
International law and numerous treaties, including the 1928
Convention Between the United States of America and Other
American Republics Regarding the Status of Aliens (Convention
Between American Republics), require countries to accept return of
their nationals. 181 But in recent years, the United States has been
confronted by thousands of cases of aliens with final orders of
removal for whom deportation is not possible. Data listing the reason
for the refusal of a nation to accept a deportee are not available. In
some instances, it may be that repatriation is refused on a specious
ground of lack of nationality because the deportee is deemed
undesirable by that nation. These categories include alleged or actual
criminals and terrorists, the mentally ill, and persons likely to
become public charges. An unknown but likely substantial percentage
is due to actual disputed nationality. Most of the persons falling into
a Stateless Person's Status Changes if He or She Has Minor Children Who Are US
Citizens by Birth, Doc. No. USA102948.E (Oct.
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49b92blec.html.

176.

16,

2008),

available at

See Moises Mendoza, Stuck in Samoa: The U.S. Refuses To Take Back This

"Stateless" Man, GLOBALPOST, (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatcb/
2
news/regions/americas/united-states/1 1002/stuck-samoa-us-refuses-stateless-MikhailSebastian (describing the plight of a stateless man deemed to have self-deported while
on vacation within U.S. territory).
Id.
177.
178.
Id.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
See Convention Between the United States of America and Other American
181.
Republics Regarding the Status of Aliens art. 6, Feb. 20, 1928, 46 Stat. 163, 2753
[hereinafter Convention Between American Republics] ("States are required to receive
their nationals expelled from foreign soil who seek to enter their territory.").
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this category likely come from the pool of undocumented aliens
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the U.S.
interior, outside of ports of entry. The largest percentage of
undocumented aliens in the United States, in turn, comes from
throughout Latin America via the border with Mexico. 8 2
The DHS does not provide data on deportees who are released or
who continue to be held in detention due to failure to obtain
agreement with a recipient country. However, reported decisions,
such as Zadvydas v. Davis'8 3 and Clark v. Martinez,8 4 prove that
these situations occur. These cases established that aliens who have
been ordered removed from the United States may not be detained
indefinitely once removal is no longer foreseeable or when there is no
reasonable likelihood of their being deported.' 8 5 If the deportee is
suspected of terrorism, the Attorney General can initiate special
"Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures" against a noncitizen and hold
the person indefinitely if no country is willing to receive him. 186
Similarly, any alien ordered removed whose removal is not
reasonably foreseeable may be detained indefinitely if deemed to
"pose a special danger to the public." 8 7

182.
See BLAS NU&4Ez-NETO, ALISON SISKIN & STEPHEN VINA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33097, BORDER SECURITY: APPREHENSIONS OF "OTHER THAN MEXICAN"
ALIENS 12, 25 (2005) (noting that 97 percent of apprehensions by the U.S. Border
Patrol occur on the border with Mexico and that the majority of non-Mexican nationals
apprehended are from Honduras, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala).
183.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
184.
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
185.
See generally Rachel Canty, The New World of Immigration Custody
Determinations After Zadvydas v. Davis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 467 (2004) (describing
the holding and implementation of Zadvydas in light of the statutory framework for
the detention of aliens); David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional
Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 S. CT. REV. 47
(2001) (explaining that Zadvydas illustrates how the Court has used a categorical
approach when examining aliens' constitutional protections, suggesting an improved
list of categories).
186.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 507(b)(2)(C), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 163, 1266 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C) (2006))
(providing that the Attorney General must make periodic efforts to secure agreement
from countries for removal while retaining sole discretion to release the alien).
187.
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f)(1) (2012). This regulation provides:
[DHS] shall continue to detain an alien if the release of the alien would pose a
special danger to the public, because: (i) [t]he alien has previously committed
one or more crimes of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16; (ii) [d]ue to a mental
condition or personality disorder and behavior associated with that condition or
disorder, the alien is likely to engage in acts of violence in the future; and (iii)
[n]o conditions of release can reasonably be expected to ensure the safety of the
public.
Id. The federal circuits have split as to whether the regulations are authorized by the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Compare Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson, 547
F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (regulations upheld), with Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478
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The Supreme Court stated in Zadvydas that if after a period of
six months "an alien provides good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonable future, the
Government must furnish evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing." 88 The Zadvydas Court vacated and remanded two cases to
consider whether ongoing negotiations on removal of de facto
stateless persons was likely to take place. 8 9 Especially after
Zadvydas, then, it is possible to find reported decisions challenging
continued detention when deportation has become unlikely. These
cases provide at least limited data about the existence of persons with
no effective nationality. They exist, however, only if litigation over
prolonged detention takes place, and if that litigation results in a
reported decision.
Other sources shed light on the scope of the problem. From 2001
to 2004, the DHS Inspector General reported that nearly 134,000
immigrants with final orders of removal had instead been released
because of the inability of the U.S. government to repatriate them to
their alleged countries of origin. 190 And just last year, hearings on the
proposed Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011 revealed further
19
details about failed U.S. efforts to deport noncitizens. 1 The bill
authorized DHS to detain "as long as necessary" certain aliens
deemed dangerous who are under orders of removal but cannot be
deported.19 2 Although reported by the House Committee on the
Judiciary in July 2011, no further action was taken in either house of
Congress.19 3
The sponsor of the Keep Our Communities Safe Act,
Representative Lamar Smith, alleged that from 2009 to 2011, "close
to 10,000 immigrants with orders of removal were released because

(5th Cir. 2008) (regulations invalid), and Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004)
(same).
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680.
188.
Id. at 702.
189.
Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 1932 Before the
190.
Subcomm. on Immigration Pol'y & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 1-2 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith,
Chairman Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
news/05242011%2OStatement.html.
See Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 1932 Before
191.
the Subcomm. on Immigr. Pol'y & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,112th
Cong. (2011) (describing, among other things, the release of one of Ashton ClineMcMurray's murderers when their home country refused to accept them). Hearing
documentation referenced below is available at Hearing Information: H.R.1932, the
"Keep Our Communities Safe Act
of
2011," COMMITTEE
JUDICIARY,
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_- 05242011.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
Hearing,supra note 190 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
192.
193.
Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 1932, 112th Cong. (2011),
availableat http://www.govtrack.us/congressibills/112/hrl932.
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their own countries refused to take them back." 19 4 Thomas H.
Dupree, Jr., a former Justice Department official, described the
causes:
In many instances, however, removal is not reasonably foreseeable-the
alien's country of origin may not take him back; our obligations under
the Convention Against Torture may not permit our removing him to
his country of origin; or his country of origin may simply be
195
unknown.

Thus, it is clear from failed deportations that documentary issues
originating elsewhere affect the citizenship of the U.S. population of
migrants.
If the citizenship of a deportee is in doubt, the first indication is
generally the refusal of a nation's consulate or embassy to issue
travel documents for entry into the country. 9 6 This refusal typically
begins diplomatic inquiries by the State Department.'9 7 Failing
resolution at the diplomatic level, an investigation abroad becomes
necessary to determine the validity of the claim that a deportee is not
a citizen of that country.' 9 8 In jus soli regimes, a birth record will
suffice. In jus sanguinis regimes, the inquiry becomes more
complicated, as proof of location of birth in that country is generally
insufficient to establish citizenship. Furthermore, the deportee may
not have lived in his alleged country of citizenship for many years,
making it less likely that country would have evidence of citizenship,
such as a passport application. All of these investigations, moreover,
require the cooperation of foreign government officials. And while

194.
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on the Judiciary,
Chairman Smith Introduces Keep Our Communities Safe Act (May 23, 2011), available
at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/05232011.html.
195.
Hearing, supra note 190 (statement of Thomas H. Dupree, Jr., Former
available at
Gen.
of the
U.S.),
Principal
Deputy
Assistant Att'y
http://judiciary.house.govfhearings/pdflDupree05242011.pdf.
196.
The INA specifies the order by which destination countries are chosen. See
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b), ch. 4, 66 Stat. 163, 208 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (2006)) (detailing complex preferences for country of
removal). DHS regulations further detail the process with respect to destination
countries, including the assertion that acceptance by the receiving country is not
required. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.15 (2012). It is difficult to reconcile this view with the
known difficulty in returning U.S. deportees, let alone the sovereignty of other nations
with respect to whom they will admit. As a matter of process, however, it permits the
designation to be made (and the deportee to continue in detention) pending diplomatic
efforts.
197.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(2)(D) (setting forth measures
that must be taken when a country is unwilling to accept removal of an alien from the
United States into that country).
198.
See id. (discussing the interrelation between multiple countries' decisions
with regard to the alien).
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these inquiries proceed, the deportee must remain incarcerated, at
government expense. 9 9
There may also be extensive proceedings in a federal court on the
issue of proof of nationality, prior to any order of removal, at least for
those represented by counsel. Take the example of "David Johnson,"
alleged to have been born in Jamaica based upon a birth certificate
with that name found in a home where Troy Jenkins (as he called
himself) lived briefly.2 00 Jenkins claimed that his citizenship, place of
birth, and birth mother's identity remained unknown. 201 Since the
defendant was subject to deportation proceedings as "David Johnson,"
Jenkins's attorney vigorously contested the government's allegation
of his identity. 202 Jenkins's brother had left him in the care of a
neighbor at a very young age, and the brother, Robert Cross, was
murdered soon thereafter, terminating Jenkins's last link to a known
family member.203

The IJ in Jenkins's case ruled that immigration agents had not
met the burden of proving that Johnson was an alien by clear and
convincing evidence, because the disputed birth certificate constituted
the sole evidence of alienage. 204 Some time later, Jenkins applied for
a Social Security number, and based on his responses, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service moved to reopen removal
proceedings. 205 With some additional evidence from Jamaica (namely,
the birth certificate of Jenkins's alleged mother), the IJ ruled that the
government had met its burden of proving alienage. 206 In Jenkins's
appeal to federal court, the Third Circuit conceded: "We understand
that this ruling leaves Johnson in legal limbo. He can not prove that
he is a citizen of the United States, and the government can not
establish that he is not a citizen of the United States." 2 07 The attempt
to deport Jenkins began in 1999 and was still unresolved by the time
of the Third Circuit's decision in 2007. No record explains what
ultimately happened to Jenkins.

199.
See id. § 241(a)(2) ("During the removal period, the Attorney General shall
detain the alien."). See generally Allyson A. Miller, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the
Key: The Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act and the Indefinite
Detention of Inadmissible Aliens, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1503 (2006) (discussing indefinite
detention under current law). For a description of historical practices with respect to
investigations of a person's nationality, see JANE PERRY CLARK, DEPORTATION OF
ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 412-13 (1969).
200.
Johnson v. Attorney General, 235 Fed. App'x 24, 27 (3d Cir. 2007).
201.
Id. at 26.
202.
See id. at 27-30 (discussing the evidence put forth by Jenkins's attorney in
the first removal hearing).
203.
Id. at 26-27.
204.
Id. at 30.
205.
Id. at 31.
206.
Id. at 31-32.
207.
Id. at 26 n.3.
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It should be noted that in some cases, noncitizens facing
deportation might destroy or hide proof of their national identity.
While those actions might not ultimately prevent deportation, they
force U.S. officials to undertake an extensive process to identify the
country of origin and to convince that country to accept the deportee
as a national. The benefit to the noncitizen may be the ability to stay
in the United States, if the government concludes it is unable to
secure a recipient nation. On the other hand, the cost to the
noncitizen could be substantial, in terms of years spent in detention
while the deportation process is pursued. The Immigration and
Nationality Act also penalizes any person with a final order of
removal who "connives or conspires, or takes any other action,
designed to prevent or hamper or with the purpose of preventing or
hampering the alien's departure."2 08 Those persons are subject to a
fine or imprisonment of up to four years, if the government can prove
the deliberate destruction of documents or other measures to hide
nationality. 209 In addition, under the proposed Keep Our
Communities Safe Act, DHS would be allowed to continue to detain
any alien who cannot be deported if, in its judgment, he or she
refused to cooperate in establishing nationality. 210
Another difficulty in establishing nationality may arise when the
country from which the alien arrived and the country of his or her
citizenship differ. This is an issue particularly with persons crossing
without documentation at the border with Mexico.2 11 Mexico's
southern border is the major conduit through which undocumented
migrants flow from Central America into Mexico and eventually the
United States. 212 Actual estimates of the number of undocumented
migrants crossing annually into Mexico vary widely and range from
150,000 to 500,000 per year. 213 Deportations from Mexico, if viewed
208.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(a)(1)(C), ch. 5, 66 Stat. 163, 212
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(C) (2006)).
Id. § 243(a)(1)(D).
209.
One of the conditions allowing DHS to detain immigrants beyond the six
210.
months specified in Zadvydas includes: "The immigrant would have been removed but
for the immigrant's refusal to make all reasonable efforts to comply and cooperate with
the Secretary's efforts to remove him." Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives,
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 194.
Transit through Mexico to reach the United States is a well-documented
211.
phenomenon. See, e.g., Catherine E. Shoicet, In Mexico, Central American Immigrants
Under Fire, CNN (July 14, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/14/world/
americas/mexico-immigrant-shelter/index.html (describing transient immigrants in
Mexico from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador).
212.
See Manuel Angel Castillo, Mexico: Caught Between the United States and
2006),
SOURCE
(Apr.
INFO.
MIGRATION
Central
America,
(noting that the
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=389
majority of Central American nationals coming into the United States cross the border
between Mexico and Guatemala).
See id. (noting the wide estimation range in the number of undocumented
213.
Guatemalans seasonally migrating into Mexico); Jennifer Dresel, Dangerous Journey.
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as a proxy for the number of undocumented aliens entering into
Mexico, confirm a steady upward trend since the late 1990s. 214 The
fact that the southern border areas of Mexico are also the sites of
extreme poverty and civil unrest compounds the problem. 215 In 20042006, nearly one million aliens were apprehended annually on the
southwest border. 216 The U.S. Border Patrol reported 165,170
apprehensions from countries other than Mexico in 2005 and 108,026
in 2006.217
While these statistics comprise a relatively small percentage of
the total apprehensions (around 10 percent), they nonetheless
constitute a significant indication of the likely total number of nonMexican residents using that country for transit to the United States.
Each one potentially presents a problem of detention, investigation,
verification, and disposition. Those numbers do not count other
persons who may have entered legally and overstayed a visa, or
passed through ports of entry with forged identity documents.
Although the Convention Between American Republics to which
the United States is a signatory requires nations of origin to receive
their nationals expelled from another state, diplomatic muscle rather
than operation of law accomplishes repatriation of deportees in the
region. 218 As Justice Kennedy noted in dissent in Zadvydas, the

Migration Through the Transit Land Mexico, HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.boell.org/web/145-Dangerous-Journey-Migration-trough-the-Transit-LandMexico.html ("Mexico's Secretariat of Governance. . . estimates that approximately
150,000 people cross the southern border into Mexico without papers every year, while
civil society organizations estimate that number at 400,000."); Danilo Valladares,
Migration-LatinAmerica: Another Wall Blocks Route to U.S., INTER PRESS SERVICE
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/09/migration-latin-america-anotherwall-blocks-route-to-us/ ("Some 500,000 migrants cross Mexican territory without
permission each year, according to Mexico's National Commission on Human
Rights. . . .").
214.
See Jennifer Johnson, The ForgottenBorder: Migration& Human Rights at
Mexico's Southern Border, LATIN AM. WORKING GRP. EDUC. FUND, Jan. 2008, at 7,
(recognizing that deportations of Central Americans has steadily increased each year
since the late 1990s).
See id. at 4 (discussing how Mexico's southern border has been marked by
215.
civil unrest such as the uprising of the Zapatista National Liberation Army in 1994).
216.
See ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33109, IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 6 (2005) (noting
that DHS cannot initiate formal proceedings against the nearly one million aliens who
cross the southern border every year).
217.
U.S. BORDER PATROL, TOTAL ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS BY FISCAL
YEAR (2011), available at http://www.cbp.govllinkhandler/cgovborder-security/
border.patrollusbpstatistics/99_10_fy-stats.ctt/9911_fy stats.pdf; see also WOMEN'S
REFUGEE COMM'N, FORCED FROM HOME: THE LOST BOYS AND GIRLS OF CENTRAL
AMERICA
(2012),
available at http://womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/
detention/unaccompanied-children (reporting an increase in unaccompanied minors
apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border who are from other nations in Central
America).
218.
See Convention Between American Republics, supra note 181, art. 6
(requiring the acceptance of expelled nationals seeking entrance to a state's territory);
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return of deportees requires the executive branch to conduct "some of
the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers." 219
Recently, the United States has used access to temporary worker
visas as a mechanism to ensure cooperation for the repatriation of
deportees. Under DHS regulations, H-2A and H-2B nonimmigrant
visas may be issued only for nationals of countries that the Secretary
of Homeland Security, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
has designated as "participating countries." 220 Countries included on
the list are those that have cooperated in U.S. deportations. The
factors include:
(1) The country's cooperation with respect to issuance of travel
documents for citizens, subjects, nationals, and residents of that
country who are subject to a final order of removal; (2) the number of
final and unexecuted orders of removal against citizens, subjects,
nationals, and residents of that country; (3) the number of orders of
removal executed against citizens, subjects, nationals, and residents of
that country; and (4) such other factors as may serve the U.S.
22
interest. 1

Interestingly, the factors include deportation orders against
"residents" of a sending nation, in addition to those it would claim as
nationals or citizens. The sending countries in the program, therefore,
have an incentive to receive back noncitizen migrants who had been
living there, presumably including unauthorized migrants. It is
difficult to imagine the United States agreeing to those terms in
treaties with other nations, but the requirement to accept the return
of noncitizens reflects both the reality of migrations and the difficulty
of establishing nationality.
Thus, the United States increasingly relies upon a preemptive
use of political persuasion to gain acceptance of deportees. This also
means that the U.S. government should have fairly specific
information about the number of refusals by each recipient country,
providing another source of estimates for the number of potentially
stateless deportees, but it does not release this data. One can also
track which countries are and are not "participating" in the H-2A/H2B visa program. 222
Earlier in the twentieth century, some government officials
believed the United States should take strong action when a country
refused the return of one of its nationals. Following the mass

Clemens Hufmann, Duty To Receive Nationals?, 24 FORDHAM L. REV. 235, 255 (1955)
(recognizing that no cases have arisen where a deportee has drawn a state into a
serious diplomatic dispute).
219.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220.
Notice, Identification of Foreign Countries Whose Nationals Are Eligible To
Participate in the H-2A and H-2B Nonimmigrant Worker Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 2915,
2915-16 (Jan. 18, 2011).
221.

Id.

222.

See id. at 2916 (providing a list of participating countries).
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displacements of World War I and at the height of the Great
Depression, the Secretary of Labor proposed a retaliatory measure
that would deny all visas for entry into the United States for
countries that refused to accept return of their nationals. The bill
based on his proposal provided:
[I]f any country refuses to admit or readmit aliens subject to
deportation under the law of the United States, and who are citizens or
subjects of such country, the Secretary of State may, in his discretion,
decline to issue a visa to any national of such country seeking to enter
223
the United States.

The measure failed to pass, allegedly due to "the international
repercussions of such a retaliatory policy and because of the lack of
relationship between the particular offenders and victims of the
policy if carried out." 22 4
In 1952, however, Congress did agree to confer this authority on
immigration officials. 225 The current version allows the Secretary of
State to stop issuing visas to nationals of countries who have refused
or delayed the return of their nationals. 226 Indeed, although the
language of the statute is mandatory ("the Secretary of State shall
order"), 227 this authority is rarely used "because of diplomatic
ramifications." 22 8 A bill introduced in 2008 tried a different approach.
It proposed to withhold U.S. financial assistance from countries that
refuse to accept return of their nationals. 229
Evidencing continued interest in this problem, a bill introduced
in Congress in 2010 would have retained mandatory language for the
retaliatory denial of visas by the Secretary of State, but it also would
have shifted some of that authority to the Secretary of Homeland

223.
(1931)).
224.
225.
(codified as
226.
227.

CLARK, supra note 199, at 416 n.1 (quoting S.J. Res. 207, 71st Leg., 3d Sess.
Id. at 416.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(d), ch. 5, 66 Stat. 163, 213 (1952)
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (2006)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added). The full text of INA § 243(d) is:

On being notified by the Attorney General that the government of a foreign
country denies or unreasonably delays accepting an alien who is a citizen,
subject, national, or resident of that country after the Attorney General asks
whether the government will accept the alien under this section, the Secretary
of State shall order consular officers in that foreign country to discontinue
granting immigrant visas or nonimmigrant visas, or both, to citizens, subjects',
nationals, and residents of that country until the Attorney General notifies the
Secretary that the country has accepted the alien.
Id.
228.
229.

H.R. REP. NO. 112-255, at 7 n.12 (2011).
H.R. 5761, 110th Cong. § 1 (2008).
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Security. 230 In addition, H.R. 6018 would have required quarterly
reports to Congress that include lists of all countries "which refuse or
unreasonably delay repatriation" and the "total number of aliens who
were refused repatriation," divided into categories.23 1 Had the
measure passed, information on failed deportations that is lacking
now would be available. Moreover, H.R. 6018 indicates the
frustration of at least some members of Congress that these data are
not currently obtainable.
Uncertain nationality is not the only obstacle to deportation, and
it may or may not be the primary one. It may be that a nation refuses
repatriation of an undesirable person even when that person is
clearly its citizen. 232 This has been a long-standing concern for the
United States. In 1927, for example, the Secretary of Labor (at that
time responsible for deportations) called attention to this problem:
In a number of instances the department has been unable to effect
deportation of undesirable aliens because of passport complications and
the refusal of foreign governments to accept from the United States
aliens who should be deported to those countries. These refusals involve
criminal and mental defective cases, as well as those who for other
reasons have become a burden upon public beneficence. Frequently the
foreign Governments decline the responsibility solely on the grounds
that by absence from the homeland the alien has become
expatriated.2 3 3

Another reason for the inability to deport someone may be the
lack of a diplomatic agreement with a specific country on the issue of
return of that country's citizens. In 2008, for example, the United
States entered into an agreement with Vietnam for deportation of
Vietnamese nationals. 234 The agreement immediately affected 8,000
Vietnamese individuals in deportation proceedings or with final
orders of removal.2 3 5 The U.S. government pays the cost of
repatriation under the agreement; the Vietnamese government issues
travel documents authorizing return, once the deportee is determined
to be a national of Vietnam. 2 36 In 2001, the United States and
Cambodia entered into a diplomatic agreement governing

230.
H.R. 6018, 111th Cong. (2010) (amending the INA to extend authority to
the Secretary of Homeland Security).
231.
Id. § 243(d)(3).
232.
See generally CLARK, supra note 199, at 414-20 (describing historical
examples of nations refusing undesirable persons).
233.
DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 191-92
(1927), as reprinted in CLARK, supra note 199, at 414.
234.
See Julia Preston, Vietnam Agrees to the Return of Deportees from the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A21 (describing an agreement between the United States
and Vietnam in January 2008, after ten years of negotiations).
235.
Id.
236.
See Press Release, Detention Watch Int'l, ICE To Resume Deportations to
Vietnam (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/527
(providing an overview of how the repatriation process will work).
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deportation, setting the stage for the deportation of some
Cambodians, many of whom had arrived in the United States as
children. 237
But even if in some cases the United States is unable to deport a
person for a reason other than disputed nationality, the result is still
effective statelessness. Zadvydas2 3 8 and Martinez239 mandate that
aliens unable to be deported may not be detained indefinitely, but
neither these cases nor U.S. law require the award of U.S. or any
other nationality. These persons are released without any clear
immigration status. Thus, the 134,000 persons whom the Unites
States allegedly could not deport between 2001 and 2004-and the
multiple thousands before and after them-are effectively stateless.
No nation will take them, and they have no immigration status in the
United States.
On the other hand, it is at least possible for these stateless
individuals to obtain work authorization. Under DHS regulations, a
stateless person can in principle obtain work authorization if the
DHS "makes a specific finding that the alien cannot be removed due
to the refusal of all countries . . . to receive the alien, or the removal

of the alien is otherwise impracticable or contrary to the public
interest."240 At least with respect to employment of persons whom it
is unable to deport, the United States appears to be in compliance
with the international conventions on statelessness. The issuance of
work permits is discretionary, however, and data are lacking on the
number of such work permits issued compared to the number of
persons potentially eligible.
It remains unknown, but capable of speculation, whether the
assistance of counsel is a necessary aid to obtain both speedy release
from detention and work authorization for the effectively stateless.
Access by all noncitizens to legal representation in removal
proceedings is problematic because there is no right to counsel
provided by the government. 241 The burden is on the noncitizen to
pursue release from detention when deportation is no longer

237.
See Tom Mintier, One-Way Ticket for Convicted Cambodians, CNN (Nov. 19,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/11/19/cambodia.returnees
2002),
(noting that the agreement requires deportation of non-U.S. citizens convicted and
sentenced to prison terms exceeding one year).
See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (finding that a statute
238.
permitting indefinite detention would raise serious Fifth Amendment concerns).
239.
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (holding that the Zadvydas
ruling applies equally to each category of alien set out in 8 U.S.C § 1231(a)(6)).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(7), ch. 4, 66 Stat. 163, 206 (1952)
240.
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7) (2006)).
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, TransportingPadilla to Deportation
241.
Proceedings:A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 43 (2011) (arguing for a right to effective assistance of counsel in
deportation proceedings).

2013/

STA TELESS IN THE UNITED STA TES

483

reasonably foreseeable, a task that would be aided immeasurably by
counsel (including informing the detainee that release is even
possible). 242 The absence of counsel can also prolong the underlying
removal proceeding and increase the possibility that a bona fide claim
of U.S. citizenship may be missed, among other things. For example,
derivative claims to U.S. citizenship are easy to overlook: minor
children become U.S. citizens automatically when the parent becomes
a naturalized citizen. 243
Moreover, because "reasonable foreseeability" is not clearly
defined by the Supreme Court, stateless persons who cannot be
deported may face long periods of detention before they are released
and become eligible for a work permit. The open-endedness of
detention while the U.S. government negotiates return is a longstanding issue. In Caranica v. Nagle,244 Nonda Caranica, a colorful
character who allegedly ran a house of ill-repute in Marysville,
California, was deported from the United States to Greece in the
1920s. 245 Caranica claimed not to be a citizen of that country, and the
Greek government also refused to accept him on that basis. 246 The
United States nonetheless kept Caranica in detention. 247 A federal
court of appeals wrote:
Nor does the fact, averred on information and belief, that the
government of the Greek Republic has refused to issue a passport for
the removal of the appellant to Greece, and will refuse to permit him to
enter that country, because not a native or citizen thereof, entitle the
appellant to an immediate discharge. Under the broad discretion vested
in him by law, the Secretary of Labor may find other ways or other
means to carry out the order of deportation, and the utmost the courts
can or will do is to discharge the appellant from further imprisonment
if the government fails to execute the order of deportation within a
248
reasonable time.

The government alleged that Caranica was a Greek citizen because
he spoke Greek and had been born in a part of the former Macedonia
that later had been absorbed by Greece. 24 9 The author has been
unable to discover what ultimately happened to him.

242.
In Zadvydas, the Court stated that when "an alien provides good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must furnish evidence sufficient to rebut that showing." 533
U.S. at 680.
243.
In a 2010 case, for example, extended litigation took place over the issue of
whether a child was born in the evening or in the morning, to determine whether he
was "under the age of 18 years" when his mother naturalized eighteen years later.
Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 630 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2010).
244.
Caranica v. Nagle, 28 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1928).
245.
Id. at 956.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Id. at 957.
249.
Id. at 956.

484

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 46:443

To conclude, the true scope of the problem of statelessness in the
United States today is not known. Despite the absence of reliable
data with respect to persons for whom deportation is impossible,
those cases demonstrate that there are thousands of persons living in
the United States with no effective nationality. Further, it is certain
that the United States has encountered this issue regionally, when
diplomatic efforts have failed to secure a receiving country. This
latter point is significant because it is already known that substantial
numbers of persons in the Americas are effectively stateless. The
shared tradition of jus soli in the region does not prevent this hidden
problem of statelessness.
These issues of disputed nationality of aliens found within the
United States are not trivial, even if the scope of the problem remains
uncertain. In instances in which the nationality of a deportee is either
unknown or disputed by the alleged country of origin, effective
statelessness already exists. The thousands of deportees that no
country will take remain stateless in the United States.
III. EXPANDING STATELESSNESS BY RESTRICTIONS ON
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP

A. The U.S. PoliticalLandscape
The preceding discussion of statelessness set the stage for
analysis of current proposals to amend birthright citizenship in the
United States. This Article demonstrates in the following sections
how and why the United States Would experience increased
statelessness from limitation of its jus soli rules, over and above the
statelessness that already exists in the country. This new
statelessness would be a result of U.S. law, and therefore the U.S.
government could no longer claim that "the laws of the United States
do not contribute to the problem of statelessness." 250 The Article will
also detail the harmful effects of this form of statelessness, both for
affected children and for the nation.
Illegal immigration is perceived by many to be a major problem
in the United States. Recent estimates have indicated that as many
as 12 million unauthorized aliens reside in the United States. 251

Eric P. Schwartz, Recognizing Statelessness, DIPNOTE: U.S. DEP'T ST.
250.
http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/
2011),
(Sept.
8,
BLOG
OFFIcIAL
recognizing-statelessness.
251.
This estimate is based on the Pew Hispanic Center's 2007 study, concluding
that as many as 12.5 million undocumented aliens were then in the United States. In
2008, the estimate was 11.2 million. Julia Preston, Decline Seen in Numbers of People
Here Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/
us/31immig.html?_r=l&partner=rssnyt.
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While some believe that all or most illegal immigrants should be
deported, the reality is that, under the current configuration of the
immigration control system, the United States is "at capacity" when
it deports approximately 400,000 persons per year. 252 This accounts
for less than 4 percent of the estimated illegal population. The cost to
run this system of removal is enormous. 253
Because there are many more undocumented aliens than it is
possible to both detect and deport, prosecutorial discretion and other
tools allow immigration officials to target immigrants who have
committed crimes, or who are otherwise undesirable, for deportation.
The Obama administration, for example, announced that low-priority
immigrant offenders who posed no threat to society would be allowed
to stay and offered work permits. 254 More recently, the Obama
administration offered "deferred action" for some illegal migrants
brought here as children. If the migrants meet certain criteria
(including arrival in the United States under the age of sixteen, and
being enrolled in or having completed school in the United States),
they will not be deported for the next two years, but they still have no
legal status or path to citizenship. 255 The top priority for ICE
continues to be any noncitizen who poses a national security or public
safety threat.256 The second priority is "recent illegal entrants," and

252.
See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement on Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention & Removal of
Aliens to Immigration & Customs Employees (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civilenforcement priorities.pdf
(recognizing that ICE only has the resources to deport approximately 400,000 aliens
per year). Included in this number are legal immigrants who may be deported for
certain crimes. Not included are persons subject to expedited removal and other
summary exclusions at the border, a figure that is said to approach one million per
year. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DIASPORA 65-67 (2012) (detailing different methods of deformalized
deportations employed by the United States).
253.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 252, at 31 (reporting that spending by ICE and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection exceeded $17 billion in 2010, up from $7.5 billion
in 2002).
254.
See Devin Dwyer, Obama Administration Curtails Deportations of NonCriminal Immigrants, ABC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2011/08/obama-administration-halts-deportations-of-non-criminal-immigrants/ (noting
that the Obama administration plans to review 300,000 pending deportations and stay
those involving individuals not convicted of a crime).
255.
See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano
Announces Deferred Action Process for Young People Who Are Low Enforcement
Priorities (June 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20120612napolitano-announces-deferred-action-process-for-young-people.shtm
(setting
the
criteria for young adults who will qualify for the deferred-action process).
256.
See id. (including within the criteria for deferred action that the individual
has not been "convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor offense, multiple
misdemeanor offense, or otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety").
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the third priority is "aliens who are fugitives or otherwise obstruct
immigration controls."25 7
Thus, the reality is that most of the unauthorized migrants in
the United States will continue to live here for the foreseeable future.
Their undocumented status often means an underground existence.
Among other impediments, with no lawful entry to the economy
available, those persons cannot legally work and, as a result, often
end up in exploitive situations.
Life for their children-if they are born here-can be different.
Under U.S. law, any child born in the United States is a citizen,
regardless of the immigration status or citizenship of their parents. 25 8
This citizenship rests on the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."259
For these children, citizenship means that they may be eligible for
welfare benefits such as Medicaid and food stamps-benefits not
available to unauthorized aliens. Any birth on U.S. soil qualifies, with
very limited exceptions. 260 A birth certificate is the only proof needed
for U.S. citizenship.
The number of citizen children born to unauthorized migrants
has been estimated to be between 300,000 and 400,000 every year. 261
One advocacy group claims that as many as one out of ten births in
the United States is to an undocumented mother. 262 These children
are sometimes referred to by the pejorative term anchor babies (the
author prefers the term citizens) for the supposed immigration

See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 252 (outlining ICE's
257.
priorities).
The Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause applies to births within
258.
the fifty states. Congress has granted citizenship to persons born in Puerto Rico, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Residents of American
Samoa are U.S. citizens if born to a parent who was a U.S. citizen, or they may
naturalize. See David Ingram, American Samoans Ask for Automatic U.S. Citizenship,
CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (July 12, 2012), http://theusconstitution.org/news/
american-samoans-ask-automatic-us-citizenship (explaining that many American
Samoans receive a passport that describes them as noncitizen U.S. nationals).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
259.
Children of diplomats and invading armies, along with American Indians
260.
born on tribal land (whose citizenship is now conferred by statute), are the historic
exceptions to jus soli in the United States. See generally Polly J. Price, Natural Law
and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 138-42
(1997) (discussing origins of U.S. birthright citizenship).
See Julia Preston, Births to Illegal Immigrants Are Studied, N.Y. TIMES,
261.
Aug. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/12/us/12babies.html?_r=O (estimating
that 8 percent of the babies born in the United States in 2008 had at least one parent
who was an illegal immigrant)
262.
Jon Feere, Birthright Citizenship in the United States: A Global
Comparison, CTR. IMMGR. STUD. 2 (Aug. 2010), http://www.cis.org/articles/2010/
birthright.pdf.
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benefits that come with being the parent of a U.S. citizen. The
children are said to create an improper foothold for their illegal
families to stay in the United States, thereby circumventing the legal
immigration process.
But the "anchor baby" concept is largely a myth. The United
States routinely deports parents of citizen children when they are in
violation of immigration laws.26 3 In the first six months of 2011 alone,
the United States deported over 46,000 parents of citizen children. 264
Often the citizen children, if minors, go with the deported parents.
The citizen children can return at any point, and at age twenty-one
they have the right to petition the Attorney General for U.S.
residency for a deported parent. 265 But if the parent had previously
been deported for immigration violations, the petition is likely to be
denied. If U.S. citizen children do not leave the country with the
deported parent, they often end up in the foster care system. 266 A
2011 estimate claimed that there are currently at least 5,100 U.S.born children in foster care whose parents have either been detained
or removed.26 7 Further, while the Pew Hispanic Center reported that
8 percent of all births in the United States from March 2009 to March
2010 were to illegal immigrant parents, very few of those parents
were recent arrivals. 268 This fact at least tempers the view that
pregnant women routinely enter the United States clandestinely in
order to give birth.

263.
See, e.g., Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977) (rejecting
the claim that deportation of the parents of a U.S.-citizen child would amount to a de
facto deportation of the child).
264.
See APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS
INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5
(2011), available at http://arc.org/shatteredfamilies (listing key facts and research
findings).
265.
See Family of U.S. Citizens, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.govIportal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6dla/?
vgnextoid=1d383e4d77d7321OVgnVCM100000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=ld383e
4d77d7321OVgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (tabulating
information about available petitions).
266.
See generally Nina Rabin, DisappearingParents:Immigration Enforcement
and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99 (2011) (demonstrating the failures
of federal immigration enforcement when children of immigrant parents end up in
state child-welfare systems).
267.
APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., supra note 264, at 6. The U.S. government does
not keep records on whether deported parents leave the country with their children or
if the state transfers their children to foster care. See Francisco Miraval, Thousands of
Children of Deported Parents Get Stuck in Foster Care, DENVER POST (Nov. 17, 2011,
9:14 AM), www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_19350445 ("Part of the problem in
estimating how many children of deported immigrants are transferred to foster
families is that national data simply do not exist.").
268.
See UnauthorizedImmigrant Population:National and State Trends, 2010,
PEw HISPANIC CTR. 1 (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf
(outlining various demographics regarding children born in the United States).
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Nonetheless, the presence of such a large number of
undocumented aliens, together with their children who are born here,
poses a significant political and social problem. States as well as the
federal government have enacted or proposed hundreds of measures
designed to deal with unauthorized immigrants by making the
United States unattractive, with the aim to create incentives for
unauthorized migrants to "self-deport." 269 That effort has included
proposals to restrict birthright citizenship in the United States. These
proposals would change the automatic award of citizenship at birth to
deny citizenship to children born to parents who entered the country
illegally. They would also deny citizenship to immigrants who are in
the United States on temporary visas, such as student or tourist
visas. 270 A poll in 2010 showed that 49 percent of Americans favored
27 1
restricting citizenship at birth to children of U.S. citizens.
The debate over how to change birthright citizenship has two
camps: those who believe Congress has the authority to limit
birthright citizenship by statute, and those who insist a
constitutional amendment is required. The attraction of congressional
authority over citizenship is obvious. It is extremely difficult to
amend the Constitution, since this requires two-thirds approval of
both congressional houses as well as ratification by three-fourths of
the states. In the past, the Republican Party called for a
constitutional amendment in its platform.2 72 The view that Congress
could accomplish the same thing by legislation is of more recent
origin.
Legal scholars have debated this issue at some length, so this
Article will not discuss it here. 273 The author shares the view that

See, e.g., Michele Waslin, Discrediting "Self Deportation"as Immigration
269.
29
Policy, IMMGR. POL'Y CTR. (February 2012), http://www.ilw.comlarticles/2012,03 waslin.pdf (describing "attrition through enforcement" as a means to disincentivize
illegal aliens to stay in the United States).
News media have reported instances of alleged "birth tourism," with
270.
arrangements for a foreign mother to give birth on U.S. soil and then return to her
home country. See, e.g., Devin Dwyer, A New Baby Boom? Foreign "Birth Tourists" Seek
U.S. Citizenship for Children, ABC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
84
3 99
Politics/birth-tourism-industry-markets-us-citizenship-abroad/story?id=10 5 56#.T
U.S.
termed
even
has
ylKwWPo. A writer for the Center for Immigration Studies
birthright citizenship law as akin to "pass[ing] out candy." John Feere, The Alleged Costs
of Ending Universal Birthright Citizenship, CTR. IMMGR. STUD. (Apr. 2012),
http://www.cis.org/Alleged-Costs-of-Ending-Universal-Birthright-Citizenship.
See William Bingle, Birthright Citizenship:Misguided Calls for Reform, 43
271.
U. TOL. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (2012) (listing this and other recent surveys).
1996),
(Aug. 9,
TRIB.
The American Birthright, CHI.
See
272.
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1996-08-09/news/9608090104_1_citizenship- 14thamendment-platform (describing one approach to U.S. birthright reform).
See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT
273.
CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (arguing that U.S.
citizenship is based on political membership by consent and that this is incompatible
with the idea of citizenship by birth for the children of illegal aliens); Katherine
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Congress has no such authority because the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment is clear. Any person-regardless of their
parents-acquires citizenship at birth so long as he or she is "subject
to the jurisdiction" of the United States. 274 Proponents of
congressional authority, however, reason that because the parents
are in the country illegally, they are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of
the United States.2 75
Without conceding the authority of Congress to change the rule
of jus soli, this Article will use as an example the Birthright
Citizenship Act of 2013 (H.R. 140)-the leading model for legislation
to limit birthright citizenship in the United States, which is also
equivalent in its terms to a proposed constitutional amendment. 276
H.R. 140, sponsored by Representative Steve King of Iowa and

Culliton-Gonzalez, Born in the Americas: BirthrightCitizenship and Human Rights, 25
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 127, 129 (2012) (demonstrating "that retraction of birthright
citizenship, even through a constitutional amendment, would be legally questionable
under international human rights norms applicable to the United States"); Garrett
Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A "Legislative History," 60 AMER. UNIV. L. REV. 331
(2010) (arguing that the "history of the [Citizenship Clause's] framing lends no support
to the idea that native-born American children should be divided into citizen and noncitizen classes depending on the immigration status of their parents"); Saby Ghoshray,
Rescuing the Citizenship Clause from Nativistic Distortion: A Reconstructionist
Interpretationof the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 261 (2012) (affirming
the extension of citizenship rights based on the Fourteenth Amendment); Alberto R.
Gonzales, An Immigration Crisis in a Nation of Immigrants: Why Amending the
Fourteenth Amendment Won't Solve Our Problems, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1859 (2012)
(discussing challenges with birthright citizenship that are outside the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment); James C. Ho, Defining "American": Birthright Citizenship
and the Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 367 (2006)
(discussing his views on the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment);
William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 221 (2008) (arguing that birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment
entails the "moral relation of the parents to the state," as identified by Emer de Vattel);
Mark Shawhan, "By Virtue of Being Born Here": Birthright Citizenship and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing birthright citizenship
in the context of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment); Rogers
M. Smith, Birthright Citizenship and the FourteenthAmendment in 1868 and 2008, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1329 (2009) (outlining the legislative history of the Citizenship
Clause); Margaret D. Stock, Is BirthrightCitizenship Good for America? 32 CATO J. 139
(2012) (discussing the history of birthright in the United States, some proposed
changes, and the likely results of those changes); Charles Wood, Losing Control of
America's Future-The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465 (1999) (discussing issues with the census and birthright
citizenship).
274.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
275.
See generally Alexander N. Li, Note, Prospective Allegiance, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 515 (2012) (summarizing the debate).
276.
See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. (2013).
Similar legislation was introduced in 1993, as well as in 2009 by Representative
Nathan Deal (R-Ga.).
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nineteen listed cosponsors, 27 7 would amend § 301 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The same bill introduced in 2011 had ninety
listed cosponsors,278 with the marked drop in support no doubt a
reflection of the 2012 elections. The official summary of H.R. 140
states that the proposed act
[almends the Immigration and Nationality Act to consider a person
born in the United States "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United
States for citizenship at birth purposes if the person is born in the
United States of parents, one of whom is: (1) a U.S. citizen or national,
(2) a lawful permanent resident alien whose residence is in the United
States, or (3) an alien performing active service in the U.S. Armed
2 79

Forces.

Unlike limitations on jus soli in the United Kingdom and
Australia, H.R. 140 and similar proposals do not provide a path to
legal residency or citizenship for children born to undocumented
aliens. A child born of undocumented aliens in the United Kingdom or
Australia, and who continues to reside there, can elect citizenship in
that country at the age of majority.28 0 Instead, the working
proposition of H.R. 140 and similar proposals 281 is that a child born in
the United States to unauthorized migrants would retain the

See Bill Summary & Status: 113th Congress (2012-2014): H.R.140:
277.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
CONGRESS),
Cosponsors, THOMAS (LIBR.
z?d113:HR00140:@@@P (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (listing the cosponsors of the
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011).
See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (2011); Bill
278.
Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012): H.R.140: Cosponsors, THOMAS (LIBR.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dl12:1:./temp/-bdnbBd:@@@P%
CONGRESS),
7C/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=112%7C (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
Bill Summary & Status: 113th Congress (2013-2014): H.R.140: CRS
279.
Summary, THOMAS (LIBR. CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d113:
HR00140:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). The Birthright Citizenship
Act of 2013 was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee
on Immigration and Border Security in January 2013.
The British Nationality Act of 1981 restricted automatic citizenship at
280.
birth to children born in the territory to at least one parent who is a citizen or
permanent resident, but also provided that children of unauthorized migrants who are
born there can nonetheless acquire citizenship with ten years of habitual residency in
the country. See AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND

GLOBAL INEQUALITY 116 (2009) ("[A]utomatic citizenship is now only conferred upon
children born in the territory to at least one parent who is a citizen or permanent
resident.").
In 2011, Senators David Vitter and Rand Paul, both Republicans,
281.
introduced a proposed constitutional amendment similar to the Birthright Citizenship
Act. Like that Act, the constitutional amendment would deny citizenship at birth in the
United States unless "at least one parent is a legal citizen, legal immigrant, active
member of the Armed Forces or a naturalized legal citizen." See Press Release, U.S.
Sens. Vitter, Paul Introduce Birthright Citizenship Legislation: Constitutional
Amendment Would Resolve 14th Amendment Issue (Jan. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.vitter.senate.gov/newsroom/press/us-sens-vitter-paul-introduce-birthrightcitizenship-legislation (detailing Senators Vitter and Paul's official support for a
constitutional amendment).
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nationality of the parent or parents, and like the parent would
remain deportable.
H.R. 140 also does not provide U.S. citizenship for children who
would otherwise be stateless. The award of nationality to prevent
statelessness for children born within a nation is now an
international standard, widely adhered to in jus sanguinis nations as
well as in countries that have limited the reach of jus soli. As one
example, in the 1990s, some politicians in Canada debated amending
that country's rules of birthright citizenship to exclude the children of
illegal migrants. 282 Notably, the proposal included the provision of
citizenship for any child who would otherwise be stateless, as well as
for children born to refugees whose claims were later accepted. 283 To
date, Canada has not changed its birthright citizenship practices, and
any political momentum for change seems to have subsided. Other
examples of nations providing citizenship to prevent statelessness
include France 284 and South Africa. 285
Supporters of the Birthright Citizenship Act claim that no child
would be born stateless in the United States. In a report entitled The

Alleged Costs of Ending UniversalBirthright Citizenship, John Feere
of the Center for Immigration Studies claimed there will be neither
the creation of a caste system nor stateless children, for two reasons:
(1) the United States will have deported all existing undocumented
aliens and prevented others from entering (or overstaying visas), and
(2) the nation of the parents' origin will always take them in as
citizens. 286 The first claim is patently ludicrous; the second claim is
simply wrong.
The implicit assumption behind the call to limit territorial
birthright citizenship in the United States seems to be that the
children of undocumented aliens, as well as their parents, would be
deported as a solution to their U.S. presence. To the extent that
births to unauthorized migrants in the United States are numerically
significant, those restrictions would makes thousands more persons
into theoretically eligible targets for deportation. The Migration
Policy Institute has estimated that the population of illegal alien

282.
See Margaret Young, Law & Gov't Div., Canadian Citizenship Act and
Current Issues, Gov'T CAN. PUBL'NS 2-3 (Aug. 1998), http://publications.gc.cal
Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp445-e.htm (discussing various issues with rights of
Canadian-born citizens).
283.
Id.
284.
See id. ("A child born in France may acquire French citizenship if ... the
child would otherwise have no citizenship.").
285.
See South African Citizenship, SOUTH AFRIcAN HIGH COMMISSION,
http://www.sahc.org.au/citizenship.htm#02 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("A foreign child
born in South Africa and who has no claim to another citizenship (stateless) may also
acquire South African citizenship by birth. Conclusive proof that the child has no other
citizenship, or claim to any other citizenship is required in such cases.").
286.
See generally Feere, supra 270.
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children born without U.S. citizenship would grow to 13.5 million by
2050.287
But deportation is not possible for stateless individuals unless
another country is willing to take them. For this and other reasons
described below, this Article maintains that the creation of a class of
stateless children is a significant argument in favor of retaining jus
soi. 88 Why these children could be stateless is explained in the next
subpart.
B. Birthright Citizenship Restrictionsand Statelessness
in the United States
The de facto statelessness described in this Article-including
births undocumented in other countries and the unclear nationality of
aliens whom the United States is unable to deport-exists despite the
fact that citizenship is almost universally derived from jus soli in the
Western Hemisphere. As already discussed, the United States
already has multiple thousands of persons it cannot deport. There are
likely thousands more that it has not (yet) tried to deport but who are
also effectively stateless. Undocumented persons in the United
States-meaning those without recognized U.S. immigration statusmay also be undocumented in their birth countries. And, before
reaching the United States, they may have migrated through another
nation under undocumented status as well. But if the United States
were to limit its jus soli regime along the lines of the Birthright
Citizenship Act, it would create an additional avenue of statelessness,
with graver consequences.
The proposed Birthright Citizenship Act assumes that a child
born to undocumented parents would acquire the parents' nationality.
But for this to occur, the nation of the parent's reputed affiliation
must recognize the child. For at least three reasons, however, a
nation might not recognize the child's citizenship, and thus three
potential routes to statelessness exist for children under the
Birthright Citizenship Act and similar proposals.
First, an effectively stateless person has no nationality to pass on
to the child. This Article previously recounteQ the existence of de
facto statelessness in the Americas as a consideration for ongoing
migration patterns that affect the United States. This explains the

287.
See Margaret Stock, The Cost to Americans and America of Ending
Birthright Citizenship, NAT'L FOUND. AM. POL'Y 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.nfap.com/
pdflNFAPPolicyBrief.BirthrightCitizenship.March2Ol2.pdf (forecasting the potential
rise of illegal alien children born without U.S. citizenship).
288.
There are, of course, other arguments for and against changing the rules of
birthright citizenship, and the academic literature on this topic is substantial. My
consideration of the issue in this Article is focused upon the potential to create
statelessness.
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presence of some of the migrants in the United States who are unable
to prove citizenship in their country of origin. The large number of
persons the United States is unable to deport evidences existing
issues of effective statelessness in the United States. A stateless
parent would not be able to pass any nationality to a child.
What if only one parent is stateless? The Birthright Citizenship
Act allows U.S. citizenship if one parent is a U.S. citizen or a lawful
permanent resident. 289 If the other parent is an undocumented alien
or even stateless, the child is still a U.S. citizen, and thus avoids
passing statelessness into the next generation. What if one parent is
stateless, and the other parent is an illegal migrant, but with a clear
nationality? Would statelessness be avoided by assigning that
parent's nationality? In this circumstance, the nationality of the child
would depend upon rules of citizenship by descent, jus sanguinis, of
that parent's nation. In many cases there will be a great deal of
uncertainty. As discussed below, citizenship-by- descent rules include
registering births, residency requirements, and rules on births to
unwed parents. A child may still end up stateless by operation of the
nationality laws of another country.
Marriage to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, then, is the
only certain way to ensure U.S. citizenship for the child under the
Birthright Citizenship Act. But births to single mothers are a
significant phenomenon among the U.S. population generally, and
single mothers can pass on statelessness when they cannot prove
their own nationality, or when the United States has attempted to
deport them but failed.2 90
With restrictions on jus sanguinis in many countries in the
region, it is also possible for second-generation emigrants (the
children born in the United States) to lack citizenship in the parents'
country, even if the parents' citizenship status there is secure. Thus,
the issue of statelessness concerns not only parents who would have
difficulty proving their own nationality, but also the laws of other
nations with respect to awarding citizenship to children born
abroad. 29 1
This second path to statelessness is in consequence of jus
sanguinisrules of other nations that already fail to provide a fallback

289.
See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. (2013)
(prescribing the result if only one parent is a U.S. citizen or national).
290.
Differences in laws establishing paternity, as well as difficulties in
establishing paternity of children born abroad to American fathers, are discussed
below.
291.
The examples of nationality laws of other countries provided below are from
the Western Hemisphere because the majority of illegal migrants in the United States
are from this region. However, nations in other parts of the world have similar rules for
children born abroad, and an "illegal alien" in the United States can, of course, be from
any part of the world because this category includes visa overstays as well as illicit
border crossers, tourists, and other temporary visitors.
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nationality at birth. All states incorporate at least some form of jus
sanguinis into their citizenship rules. 292 Most nations have
generational limits and registration requirements for the
transmission of nationality by descent to persons born outside of that
country. In Peru, for example, children born to Peruvian parents
outside of the country must be registered by their parents by age
eighteen in order for the child to obtain citizenship.29 3 While some of
these registration requirements direct the parents to the nearest
consulate or embassy for the citizenship to be recognized (for
example, Haiti),294 others are a form of residency requirement,
requiring travel to the home country in order to register the birth.
Uruguay, for example, awards citizenship for children born abroad to
a Uruguayan parent only if the child is registered in person at that
country's Civic Register for Vital Records. 295
In some countries, a child born abroad must return in order to
maintain citizenship. In Chile, a child born abroad to at least one
parent who is a citizen of Chile must establish residence in that
country before the age of twenty-one. 296 Similarly, Colombia requires
that a child born abroad must establish residency in Colombia for
citizenship by descent.2 97 Ecuador allows the children born abroad to
a native-born Ecuadorian parent to become citizens only if the child
becomes a resident of that country. 298 Panama limits citizenship by
descent from a naturalized Panamanian parent to children who
declare their intention to elect Panamanian nationality no later than
one year after reaching eighteen. 299 In Venezuela, the parents must
return with the child to reside in that country before the child reaches
the age of eighteen.30 0 Further, the child born abroad must declare
Venezuelan nationality before reaching the age of twenty-five. 30 '
Most nations also have complicated rules for determining
nationality in cases of out-of-wedlock birth abroad, although the U.S.
government publication Citizenship Laws of the World, the most
readily available source of nationality laws, does not specify what any
nation requires in order to establish paternity.30 2 Further, some

292.
See PETER SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER
GLOBALIZATION 10-11 (2008) (defining jus sanguinis).
293.
See 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PERU, supra note 99, at 18 (discussing
citizenship in Peru).
294.
U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 95, at 90.
295.
Id. at 210.
296.
Id. at 50.
297.
Id. at 53.
298.
Id. at 68.
299.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 213.
300.
Id.
301.
302.
See id. at 4 (providing an overview of the report); see also Citizenship Laws
of the World, MULTIPLECITIZENSHIP.COM, www.multiplecitizenship.onm/ worldsummary.html
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nations require "legitimate" births in order to transmit citizenship
abroad. In the Bahamas, a child born abroad legitimately to. a father
who is a citizen becomes a citizen by descent.303 Registration is
required for any person (eighteen years or older) born in wedlock
outside the Bahamas to a Bahamian mother. 304 The Bahamas appear
to have no process at all for an unwed father to establish paternity.3 0 5
The State Department asserts that this citizenship policy, together
with the fact that the Bahamas is one of the rare Western
Hemisphere nations without jus soli, has resulted in "several
generations" of stateless persons living in that country and
elsewhere.30 6 Like the Bahamas, Barbados allows fathers to pass
their citizenship by descent only if married to the mother.30 7 Children
born out of wedlock to a Barbadian mother may inherit her
citizenship.30 8 In both instances, the child must be registered with
the nearest diplomatic representative.3 09 In Argentina, both parents
must be Argentine citizens in order for a child born abroad to be a
citizen of Argentina. 310
Several nations in the Western Hemisphere-including, notably,
Mexico and Canada-have tightened jus sanguinis rules for children
born outside of those nations. By constitutional amendment in 1997,
Mexico limited the award of its nationality to the first generation
born abroad.31 1 Similarly, Canada amended its citizenship laws to
limit citizenship by descent to one generation born outside of

(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("The directory provides a simplified overview, not a
detailed legal analysis.").
303.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 95, at 26 (explaining
procedures for citizenship for the children of male citizens of the Bahamas who are
born abroad).
304.
See id. (stating the procedures for a child born abroad to a mother in
wedlock to gain Bahamian citizenship).
305.
See id. (demonstrating difficulties for an unwed Bahamian father to
establish his child's citizenship).
306.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BAHAMAS 10 (2012),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186698.pdf ("The narrow
window for application, difficult documentary requirements, and long waiting times
created generations of de facto stateless persons.").
307.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 95, at 29 (stating Barbados's
acceptance of a father passing citizenship by descent if he is married to the mother of
the child).
308.
See id. (highlighting Barbados's acceptance of a mother's citizenship being
inherited by the child, even if the child was born out of wedlock).
309.
See id. (reinforcing that the child must be registered with the diplomatic
representative).
310.
See id. at 19 (stating Argentina's requirements that both parents be
citizens for children born abroad to be citizens).
311.
See David Fitzgerald, Nationality and Migration in Modern Mexico, 31 J.
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 171, 176-77 tbl.1 (2005) (demonstrating Mexico's history
in awarding nationality).
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Canada. 312 For Canada, this change was said to "protect the value of
citizenship."3 1 3 For those grandfathered under the prior law, someone
who was born in the second generation outside Canada who turned
twenty-eight before April 17, 2009, but did not fulfill the residency
requirement, is not considered a Canadian citizen. 314 For both
Canada and Mexico, the result under the proposed U.S. Birthright
Citizenship Act would be statelessness for the second generation born
in the United States, even though the parents would remain
Canadian and Mexican citizens.
Mexico is of special interest because it is a contiguous nation and
its nationals are thought to constitute the highest percentage of the
undocumented immigrant population in the United States.3 15 While
Mexico has generational limits on citizenship, it is otherwise
relatively generous with respect to awarding Mexican citizenship to
the first generation born abroad. A parent who is a native-born or
naturalized Mexican is required to register the child at the nearest
Mexican consulate, followed by a birth registration in Mexico. 316
Proving paternity to satisfy Mexican nationality law, however,
remains a complicated issue. It is also unclear how many parents can
themselves prove Mexican nationality. Undocumented Mexican
immigrants may have arrived in the United States without proof of
any nationality. As noted previously, failure to register births in
Mexico has attracted the attention of human rights organizations.
Documentation of births-and hence proof of Mexican nationality-is
especially problematic in rural and indigenous areas. Canada, the
other land-based, contiguous nation, also has generous provisions for
extending citizenship to children born outside the country. Only one
parent needs to be a Canadian citizen in order to pass on citizenship,
but that parent cannot be an adoptive one.3 17 In other words,
adoption by a Canadian citizen living abroad does not transmit
citizenship to the adopted child.
A third path to statelessness for children includes residency
requirements that might terminate the citizenship of the parent, or

312.
See New Citizenship Rules, CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. CAN. (Apr. 20, 2010),
Canada's
(explaining
http://www.cic.gc.calenglish/citizenship/rules-citizenship.asp
limitations on citizenship by descent).
313.
Id.
See Retention of Citizenship, CITIZENSHIP & IMMIG. CAN. (Apr. 21, 2009),
314.
(discussing the exceptions for
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/citizenship/retention.asp
those grandfathered under the prior law).
315.
See infraAppendix.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 95, at 133 (explaining the
316.
registration requirements for parents who are native-born or naturalized citizens of
Mexico).
See Young, supra note 282, at 2 ("Persons considered to be natural-born
317.
Canadian citizens can be born either in Canada . .. or outside Canada if, at the time of
birth, one parent is a Canadian citizen.").
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terminate the conditional citizenship of the child born in the United
States. Some nations terminate citizenship following residency
outside the country for a period of time, on the ground that the
subject has "expatriated" him or herself. For example, Germany for
many years considered a person to be expatriated if he or she resided
abroad for more than ten years.3 18 In an extreme example, Cubans
are said to lose their rights as citizens after eleven months abroad, a
policy no doubt linked to that nation's restrictions on travel by its
own citizens.31 9 The Cuba example is driven by the unique political
circumstances of the island, but it is also true that naturalized
Canadians formerly were subject to a one-year limit on residency in
the United States before losing Canadian citizenship. 320 Canadian
law now provides for involuntary loss of citizenship for any
naturalized citizen who has spent more than ten years outside of
Canada. 321
In other examples, El Salvador law provides for involuntary loss
of citizenship for absence from the country for more than five years,
even for native-born citizens. 322 An involuntary loss of Haitian
citizenship can occur when a naturalized Haitian citizen "maintains
continuous residence abroad without authorization by Haitian
authorities."323 Likewise, naturalized Mexican citizens can lose that
status by residing outside of the country for five years. 324 The United
States has had long experience with foreign governments taking the
position that former nationals have expatriated themselves. In 1927,
a government official claimed: "Frequently the foreign Governments
decline the responsibility [to accept a deportee] solely on the grounds
that by absence from the homeland the alien has become
expatriated."32 5
Even in the United States, extended residence abroad can mean
the inability to pass on U.S. citizenship to children. These children
could be stateless at birth if born in a country that relies upon jus
sanguinis for citizenship. Under U.S. law, in order for the child to
acquire U.S. citizenship, the citizen parent must have been physically
present in the United States for a specified length of time prior to the

318.
CLARK, supra note 199, at 407.
319.
See Victoria Burnett, New Hints at Looser Rules on Travel Stir Hope in
Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at A8 ("After eleven months abroad, Cubans usually
lose their rights as citizens.").
320.
See CLARK, supra note 199, at 410 ("So a person born in England but living
in Canada since early childhood would lose his domicile there if he resided a year in the
United States.").
321.
See U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 95, at 46 (outlining the
voluntary and involuntary circumstances in which Canadians will lose citizenship).
322.
Id. at 71.
323.
Id. at 90.
324.
Fitzgerald, supra note 311, at 176-77 tbl.1.
325.
CLARK, supra note 199, at 414 (quoting the Secretary of Labor).
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child's birth.32 6 The aim of the physical presence requirement is to
prevent the transmission of U.S. citizenship by descent through
generations of expatriates who have no connection to the country.
From 1934 to 1978, the child born abroad also had to establish
residency in the United States or risk losing U.S. citizenship. 327 The
most recent statute required the child to be physically present in the
United States for five years between the ages of fourteen and twentyeight.32 8
For births to unmarried parents of mixed citizenship, if the
mother is the U.S. citizen, the required period of physical presence in
the United States is one continuous year at any point in the woman's
life.32 9 If the father is the U.S. citizen, the required physical presence
has been as long as ten years, five of which had to be after the age of
fourteen.33 0 Under current law, the period of residency for unwed
fathers is five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age
of fourteen. 331 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in a per curiam
affirmance upheld the lengthier U.S.-residency requirements for U.S.citizen fathers who wish to transmit citizenship to their out-ofwedlock children at birth.33 2 There also has been substantial
litigation to establish the U.S. citizenship of children in the case of

See Immigration and Nationality Act § 301, ch. 1, 66 Stat. 163, 235 (1952)
326.
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006)); id. §309. If only one parent is a U.S.
citizen, physical presence of five years in the United States, at least two of which were
after attaining the age of fourteen years, is required to transmit U.S. citizenship to a
child. See id. § 301(g). If both parents are citizens, one of them must have had a
residence in the United States prior to the birth. See id. § 301(c).
Acquisition of U.S. Citizenship by Birth Abroad to U.S. Citizen Parent, in 7
327.
FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 1130 (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/86757.pdf (outlining procedures for children born abroad to acquire
citizenship).
The Supreme Court has held that Congress retains the power to impose
328.
such residency requirements for U.S. citizens born abroad. See Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815, 815 (1971) (recognizing congressional authority for imposing residency
requirements).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 309(c), ch. 1, 66 Stat. 163, 238 (1952)
329.
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2006)).
In United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff'd, 131
330.
S.Ct. 2312 (2011), the court noted the physical presence requirement in effect at the
time of Flores-Villar's birth:
While § 1409(c) required an unwed citizen mother to be continuously present in
the United States for only one year, § 1401(a)(7) required an unwed citizen
father to be physically present in the United States for at least ten years before
birth, five of these years after his fourteenth birthday, to pass citizenship.
Eric Newhouse, Note, "He's Not Your Real Dad" In United States v. Flores-Villar, the
Ninth Circuit Erroneously Denied Equal Protection that Would Enable a Father to
Transmit United States Citizenship to His Foreign-Born Child, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV.
581, 585 (2013) (citing Flores-Villar,536 F.3d at 994-95).
331.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 309(a).
Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2312, 2312 (2011).
332.
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unwed fathers, due to the complicated statutory scheme for
establishing paternity.3 3 3
While the three paths described above are the primary
contributors to the existence of stateless children born in the United
States, changing the U.S. rule of birthright citizenship will create
additional paths to statelessness. One path is if the country of the
parent's origin no longer exists or its boundaries have changed. 3 34
This phenomenon has occurred in several areas of the world in recent
decades. 33 5 In addition, children born in the United States to refugees
and asylum seekers who cannot be returned to their countries of
origin could also end up effectively stateless. Not all persons who are
granted a reprieve from deportation because of legitimate fear of
persecution become eligible for U.S citizenship or legal permanent
residence status. Those children might receive the citizenship of the
parent as a matter of law, but they would obtain only a nominal and
ineffective nationality because of their inability to return to that
country.
In summary, only fail-proof border control can prevent the
entrance of persons who are already effectively stateless with respect
to their own countries. And only diplomatic muscle can ensure that
deportees are accepted for repatriation. An originating nation's
refusal to accept the return of an alleged national or habitual resident
of that country is at best a matter of political persuasion. It is not a
dispute over an enforceable right to repatriation under regimes

333.
See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 53-73 (2001) (upholding as
constitutional the legitimation proof requirements in INA § 309(a)(4)); see also Morgan
G. Miranda, A (Stateless) Stranger in a Strange Land: Flores-Villar and the Potential
for Statelessness Under U.S. Law, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 379, 382, 416, (2012)
(discussing Flores-Villar and other litigation as well as legislative history). Among
other requirements to establish paternity are the following:
(4)

while the person is under the age of 18 years(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or
domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under
oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a
competent court.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 309(a)(4).
334.
Refugees International reports the case of a woman living in the United
States who became stateless following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite her
marriage to a U.S. citizen, she remains stateless because she cannot adjust her status.
The United States tried but failed to deport her back to the former Soviet republics.
She has no immigration status in the United States and no work permit. See
SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 10, at 9.
335.
One example is a case before the European Court of Human Rights, Makuc
v. Slovenia. The Slovenian government is alleged to have failed to restore status to over
18,000 citizens who were deleted from civil registries. See id. at 7.
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currently in place (although some members of Congress would like to
strengthen penalties for refusals). But the other paths to
statelessness for children, described above, are not under U.S.
control, unless the United States can influence the citizenship laws of
other nations, as well as ensure documentation of citizenship.
The existence of stateless individuals already in the United
States combined with the citizenship rules of other nations means
that limitation of birthright citizenship in the United States would
produce a new class of stateless children. As Linda Kerber concluded,
"[S]tatelessness is no longer so easily measured only by the presence
or absence of a passport; it is a state of being produced by new and
increasingly extreme forms of restriction and of the creation of new
categories of stateless human beings." 336

C. The Meaning and Consequences of Expanded,
MultigenerationalStatelessness
Finally, this Article turns to the consequences of statelessness in
the United States, both for the individuals involved and for the
nation. This subpart begins with consideration of the harms of
existing statelessness in the United States-i.e., those persons whose
statelessness is created outside of the United States. Not only would
many of these adverse effects be shared by stateless children born
under a revised jus soli, but generational statelessness also would
bring significant additional problems, as described below.
Individuals who cannot be deported, and who are thus effectively
stateless, receive at least some measure of protection from the U.S.
government. -These individuals may be permitted to work if the
government believes that they have cooperated in the attempt to
establish a nationality. Section 241(a)(7) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act states that a person may be granted employment
authorization upon a specific finding that they cannot be removed for
lack of a country willing to receive them.3 37 Unless classified as a
threat to the community, they must generally be released within six
months of the determination that a willing recipient country cannot
338
When
be found or that it is not foreseeable that one can be found.
DHS releases them, they are subject to periodic monitoring and must
continue to assist DHS in the attempt to acquire travel documents to
facilitate their departure--apparently into perpetuity.33 9 At this

Kerber, supra note 52, at 745.
336.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(7) (codified as amended at 8
337.
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(7) (2006)).
See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 372, 375, 386 (2005) (discussing the
338.
presumptive reasonable period of time to detain aliens before release).
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.5(a) (2012) ("An alien released pursuant to § 241.4 shall
339.
be released pursuant to an order of supervision."); see also Immigration and
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point, DHS may, but is not required to, issue employment
authorization. 340 The exercise of that discretion is not reviewable by a
federal court. 341 Moreover, the deportee is left without an
immigration status in the United States, as well as without an
effective nationality.
The possibility of work authorization for persons who cannot be
deported does not reference statelessness explicitly. No similar
possibility of a work permit is available for other stateless persons
living in the United States who are not in removal proceedings. Thus,
stateless persons other than deportees are not specifically provided
any type of immigration benefits, unless the United States has tried
and failed to deport them. There is no mechanism in the United
States to systematically identify and protect stateless persons.
Stateless persons outside of the country may qualify for
admission into the United States as asylees or refugees, one of the
few instances
in which U.S.-immigration
law references
statelessness.34 2 Under the Refugee Act of 1980, asylum is predicated
on a "well-founded fear" of persecution in the home country, while
"withholding of removal" is available when an individual's "life or
freedom would be threatened." 343 Asylum status brings with it more
protections than the defensive "withholding of removal" status.
Asylees are granted work authorization and can access some public
assistance. They also may elect permanent residence status after one
year in the United States. Those granted withholding of removal, by
contrast, can sometimes receive public assistance and work

Nationality Act § 241(a)(3) (discussing supervision after the ninety-day removal period
if the alien is not removed).
340.
8 C.F.R. § 241.5(c) (2012); see also Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 241(a)(7) (discussing employment authorization). Section 241.5(c) of 8 C.F.R.
provides:
An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may, in his or her
discretion, grant employment authorization to an alien released under an order
of supervision if the officer specifically finds that:
(1) The alien cannot be removed in a timely manner; or
(2) The removal of the alien is impracticable or contrary to public
interest.
8 C.F.R. § 241.5(c).
341.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241.
342.
Id. § 101(a)(42) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006))
(defining refugee); see also 8 C.F.R. § 209.1-.2 (2012) (discussing the adjustment of the
status of refugees and aliens granted asylum). See generally Sarah B. Fenn, Note,
Paripovic v. Gonzales: Defining Last Habitual Residence for Stateless Asylum
Applicants, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545 (2007) (discussing the issues faced by asylum
applicants who are stateless).
343.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2006)) (discussing the application and selection of asylum applicants
and restrictions on removal to a country where an alien's life or freedom would be
threatened); id. § 241(b)(3) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006)) (same).
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authorization, but there is no provision to adjust status to that of a
lawful permanent resident in the United States. Furthermore, they
remain subject to removal from the country at any time to a willing
third country: "They may remain in this form of uncertain legal limbo
for decades . . .. 344
Stateless persons already living in the United States also may
apply for asylum, but with strict limitations. Only a successful
asylum application would result in a defined U.S.-immigration status
and the possibility to work legally. Yet if the effectively stateless
individual is also an unauthorized immigrant-likely to be the casecontacting the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
with an ultimately unsuccessful asylum claim could well result in the
institution of removal proceedings. Most importantly, noncitizens
only have a one-year window to apply for asylum after their arrival in
the United States. 345 Long-resident undocumented aliens may only
discover that they have a valid claim to refugee status well after the
one-year deadline. One study criticizing the one-year deadline found
that the BIA "denies asylum to large numbers of refugees fleeing
persecution on the basis of the asylum deadline alone."3 46
Thus, statelessness does not pose an absolute bar to obtaining an
immigrant visa to enter the United States, 347 nor does it pose an
insurmountable problem in an asylum or refugee claim. But these
avenues are of little relevance to unauthorized migrants living in the
United States who are also effectively stateless. The availability of an
immigrant visa to enter the United States, even if the would-be
immigrant cannot prove nationality, is in practice limited to persons
who already have a strong claim for asylum or refugee status.
Whether the United States would aid an illegal migrant already
living in the United States would turn on the ability of that migrant

ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 814.
344.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(a)(2) (emphasizing that the
345.
alien must demonstrate "by clear and convincing evidence that the application has
been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States"); 8
C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2), (4)-(5) (2010) (discussing the one-year filing period and certain
exceptions including "changed circumstances" and "extraordinary circumstances").
346.
See NAT'L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST & PENN STATE
LAW, THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: No PROTECTION, No PROCESS 2
(2010), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
1YD%20report%2OFULL%202010%2010%2020%20FINAL.pdf.
In addition to asylum, another avenue to enter the United States even if
347.
stateless is the President's power to "parole in place." Under this provision, the
Attorney General "may ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to
the United States." Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (2006)).
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to gain asylum. 34 8 Long-term illegal residents would face an uphill
battle, proving entitlement to this protected status, with the necessity
to self-identify as being in the United States illegally.
Given that there is no system to identify or remedy statelessness
in the United States, what is the harm of being stateless in this
country today? After all, the Due Process Clause covers all persons,
including unauthorized migrants and the stateless.34 9 In many ways,
the plight of the stateless in the United States today is the same as
that of an unauthorized immigrant with a clear nationality-for
example, no access to social welfare or most government services and
barriers to participation in the legitimate economy. Unauthorized
immigrants also have limited or no access to the legal system and law
enforcement for protection, because they have incentives to avoid it.
Aggressive immigration enforcement makes immigrant communities
afraid to come forward either as crime victims or witnesses, because
they do not distinguish the local police from the authorities who may
put them in detention and removal proceedings. In addition, human
trafficking is a significant problem as well as a likely route of entry
for persons with unclear nationality. 350 The nation as a whole
benefits from the constructive economic energies of its populaceengagement in work, establishment of businesses, provision of
services, innovation-but these benefits only accrue when people can
participate legitimately in the economy, not when they are forced
underground due to lack of legal status. Illegal employment may also
depress wages for U.S.-citizen workers.
Furthermore, long-term residents with no U.S.-immigration
status constitute a permanent underclass with no path to citizenship,
living with the permanent threat of deportation. They cannot
participate in the political process, yet they are governed by its laws,

348.
Undocumented aliens without a nationality are also eligible for T and U
visas, for victims of trafficking and crimes of violence within the United States. See
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, 114 Stat.
163, 1464 (2000). Eligibility for T or U status would require a number of waivers,
including for unlawful presence. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(3),
(13)(A) (granting DHS the ability to waive all inadmissibility grounds for T applicants
excluding threats to national security, international child abduction, and renunciation
of U.S. citizenship for tax purposes); 8 C.F.R. § 212.16(b)(3) (2012) (noting that waivers
should be granted especially if inadmissibility would prevent adjustment of status).
There is also an express waiver of the passport requirement for T-2, T-3, and T-4
dependents if there is an "unforeseen emergency." 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(o). Similarly,
waivers are possible for U visas, for victims of violence. Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(d)(14). A successful application for T or U visa status can lead to legal
permanent residency and U.S. citizenship.
349.
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (indicating that the Due
Process Clause also extends to aliens within the United States); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 202, 210-12 (1986) (reaffirming that the Due Process Clause applies to all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States, regardless of citizenship).
350.
See SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 11, at 3 ("Statelessness is both a
cause and a consequence of trafficking.").

VANDERBILTJOURNAL

504

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:443

a fact that undermines participatory democracy in principle and in
practice. The existence of this underclass creates problems of
exploitation for the noncitizens and also causes social tension and
distortion of the democratic process. The presence of this underclass
also engenders fundamental unfairness and discrimination, for
reasons articulated by Daniel Kanstroom in the context of
deportation. 351 Kanstroom notes, "[Als the history of deportation
shows so clearly, we simply cannot easily disaggregate nationality
35 2 In short, the
discrimination from its racial and ethnic aspects."
3
35
plight of the unauthorized migrant is generally dire.
But an unauthorized migrant with a clear nationality can return
to his or her country of origin and pursue life where political,
354 Stateless people
economic, and social participation is possible.
cannot. Illegal immigrants with a firm nationality can also receive
consular assistance in matters including protection, travel
documents, and judicial proceedings.35 5 A stateless immigrant
cannot. As the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada noted,

351.

See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM,

DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN

AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (laying out the difficulties faced by long-term residents
without an immigration status and how they face the constant threat of deportation).
Id. at 246.
352.
In 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an Advisory
353.
Opinion at the request of Mexico concerning the legal status and rights of
undocumented migrants. The court's opinion stated unequivocally that such persons
are entitled to all international human rights. See Ryszard Cholewinski, Human
Rights of Migrants: The Dawn of a New Era?, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 593 (2010). In
addition, the UN Human Rights Council has yet to issue publicly a written report
following its Universal Periodic Review in 2010. The reviews of all 192 UN member
states are designed to ensure that human rights obligations, including those applicable
to migrants, are met. See id. at 591. The Report of the United States submitted in
conjunction with this review is available at U.S. Dep't of State, Rep. of the U.S.
Submitted to the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights in Conjunction with the
Universal

Periodic

Review

(2010),

available

at

http://www.state.gov/

documents/organization/146379.pdf.
Indeed, for the undocumented Mexican population in the United States,
354.
"circular" migration back to Mexico is not uncommon. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE
DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN
AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 10 (2002) ("[Elach year thousands of undocumented
migrants and even many legal immigrants decide to return to Mexico.").
One measure of the value of consular assistance would be the frequency
355.
with which it is invoked, as well as the reasons for seeking assistance, by those with
access. Article V of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations lists these "consular
functions." Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). These
functions include advice and support in the case of an accident, serious illness, or
death; advice and support to victims of serious crime overseas; visitation contact with
incarcerated nationals; liaison with local police officials in the case of nationals
abducted or missing overseas; provision of loans to distressed travelers; help during
crises, such as civil unrest and natural disasters; and facilitation of the overseas
payment of social welfare benefits; among others. Consular Assistance, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilConsularassistance (last updated Aug. 26, 2012).
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"Generally, stateless individuals in the US with no legal status (i.e.,
they are ineligible for asylum status, withholding of removal, relief
under the Convention against Torture) are quite vulnerable, though
there are
some procedural
protections
against indefinite
detention." 356
Compounding the problem is the fact that the United States is
unlikely to be able to deport stateless persons, often resulting in a
lengthy period of detention.3 5 7 This fact-impossibility
of
deportation-is a problem both for the individual and for the United
States. From the government's perspective, statelessness is
undesirable if the goal is the deportation of an unauthorized
population. From the individual's perspective, statelessness can mean
lengthy detention during the government's attempt to remove him or
her to another country. This is especially true for those individuals
with criminal convictions, including aggravated felonies,35 8 which
under federal immigration law can include crimes that are nonviolent
and considered only misdemeanors under state law. 359 Furthermore,
upon release from detention, the person is effectively stateless, with
no U.S. immigration status awarded. In most respects the stateless
deportee remains excluded from U.S. society.
There are yet other ways in which statelessness harms the
United States. The administrative cost to determine nationality in
these deportation cases is not insignificant. The alien may not have
had an attorney to pursue his or her identity claim through layers of
administrative appeal, and thus the effective statelessness may come
as a surprise to the government at the deportation stage. The failure
of another nation to accept the U.S. government's claim of the alien's
nationality will often entail lengthy investigations abroad. The
government pays the cost of detention during this time.

356.
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN., supra note 175 (emphasis added).
357.
Many persons facing deportation are in detention, and this is especially
true for the latter stages of deportation proceedings. Detention during the removal
process is mandatory. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), ch. 5, 66 Stat. 163,
204 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) (2006)). The INA and regulation
specify a ninety-day "removal period" with certain exceptions as to release. Id.
§ 241(a)(1), (3); 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2012).
358.
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (a)(1) (referring to aliens convicted of one or more
aggravated felony offenses as "excludable" aliens). See generally Eliot Walker, Note,
Safe Harbor: Is Clark v. Martinez the End of the Voyage of the Mariel?, 39 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 121 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Clark v. Martinez in
releasing thousands of imprisoned inadmissible aliens).
359.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)) (identifying the offenses that rise to "aggravated felony");
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 27, at 749-50 (discussing how some state misdemeanors are
considered aggravated felonies under federal immigration law). For a discussion of
proportionality in deportation, see Angela Banks, The Normative and HistoricalCases
for Proportional Deportation, EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract+2044801.
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What, then, is the additional harm of the multigenerational
statelessness that would ensue from limitation on birthright
citizenship in the United States? From a practical standpoint, many
more persons would be subject to deportation, with the attendant
costs, whether they are stateless or whether they have a nationality.
Recent estimates have placed births to the undocumented population
as high as 400,000 per year. 3 60 But attempts to deport the stateless
ultimately prove futile. The harm to individuals comes from
prolonged detention, and harms to the nation would include wasted
administrative resources and at least a partially thwarted rationale
for changing birthright citizenship in the first place, if enough of
these children cannot be deported.
In addition to the impossibility of deporting stateless-children,
there are more adverse consequences for children born stateless.
Because they cannot "self-deport," these children would live their
entire lives in this country without the possibility of full membership
in the polity, absent political action. They would have no other home
and would become a permanent underclass. Furthermore, they would
in turn have no nationality to pass on to their own children,
potentially creating multigenerational statelessness in the United
States.
The United States would also face censure by the international
community. 36 ' The American Convention on Human Rights, which
the United States has signed but not ratified, states: "Every person
has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was
362
The
born if he does not have the right to any other nationality."
at
only
not
Birthright Citizenship Act would put the United States
1961
the
variance with the American Convention, but also with
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (which the United
States has not joined). The 1961 Convention, among other things,
stipulates the award of citizenship to persons born in a nation's
36 3
It also requires a
territory who would otherwise be stateless.
contracting state to allow UNHCR access within its territory, or
otherwise to establish an administrative mechanism to which a
stateless person may apply for the examination of his or her claim
364
and for assistance in presenting it to the appropriate authority.

Preston, supra note 261.
360.
See SOUTHWICK & LYNCH, supra note 11, at i ("Because states have the
361.
sovereign right to determine the procedures and conditions for acquisition and loss of
citizenship, statelessness and disputed nationality must ultimately be resolved by
governments. But state determinations on citizenship must conform to general
principles of international law.").
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 20, 1 2.
362.
See 1961 Convention, supra note 8, art. 1 (discussing when a "Contracting
363.
State shall grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise
be stateless").
Id. art. 11.
364.
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Moreover, the United States already does not follow all of the
provisions of the 1954 Convention, meaning it is unlikely to do so in
the event of a change in birthright citizenship. Among other
provisions, stateless individuals should have free access to courts.36 5
Stateless individuals in the United States, like other undocumented
aliens, have incentives to avoid this for fear of drawing attention to
their status. The right to pursue wage-earning employment or a
profession, unless awarded as a matter of discretion following a failed
deportation or a successful asylum claim, likewise remains
unavailable. 366 Access to housing under the 1954 Convention should
be on the same basis as (legal) noncitizens generally. 367 The
undocumented in the United -States, and hence also the stateless, are
not eligible for public-housing
assistance and experience
discrimination in both small communities and large urban areas. The
1954 Convention extends the same principle-treatment as favorable
as that given to legal noncitizens-to access to higher education.36 8
Finally, under the 1954 Convention, stateless persons should receive
the same treatment as U.S. citizens with respect to public relief and
assistance. 369
The Birthright Citizenship Act, moreover, would set a course in
defiance of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
states that national governments have a duty to grant citizenship to
children born in their territory if the child is not recognized as a
citizen of another country.37 0 The right of a child to acquire a
nationality, furthermore, requires efforts by the nation where the
child is born to assist the family in pursuing a citizenship claim
elsewhere.3 7 This onerous task-requiring knowledge of citizenship
regimes of nations throughout the world-would certainly be in the
interest of the United States to pursue in order to help avoid
statelessness and, perhaps, preserve the ability to deport in the
future. The United States is not a signatory to the UN Convention on

365.
See 1954 Convention, supra note 14, art. 16, 1 1 ("A stateless person shall
have free access to the Courts of Law on the territory of all Contracting States.").
366.
See id. arts. 17, 19 (discussing wage-earning employment and professions of
stateless persons).
367.
See id. art. 21 ("As regards housing, the Contracting States ... shall accord
to stateless persons lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as
possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in
the same circumstances.").
368.
Id. art. 22, 1 2.
369.
See id. art. 23 ('The Contracting States shall accord to stateless persons
lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and
assistance as is accorded to their nationals.").
370.
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 37, art. 7, IT 1-2.
371.
See id. T 1.
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the Rights of the Child, but every other country in the world is, with
the exception of Somalia, which lacks a functioning government. 372
This Article also takes the position that creating statelessness at
birth, as well as creating a permanent underclass of noncitizens more
generally, constitutes a moral wrong in a democratic nation. These
children will not have chosen their situation,37 3 nor will they have
violated any U.S.-immigration laws. As such, they have a special
claim in a liberal society. 374 Jus soli is democratically superior
because it creates the presumption that populations living within a
nation's borders are members of the political community, absent proof
of nonmembership by birth elsewhere. Place of birth is a
burden-of-proof issue that is relatively easy to resolve.
Creating a stateless underclass exposes those people not only to
unlawful exploitation, including forced labor, but also to the
unprincipled exercise of public authority. For example, statelessness
(as well as undocumented status more generally) allows law
enforcement to target ethnic subcultures randomly for abusive
enforcement on minor matters, because they know individuals in
these communities cannot fight back and will likely leave. This is not
an unknown phenomenon now, as the Department of Justice's
lawsuit against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, indicates.3 75
Creating increasing numbers and multiple generations of the
stateless will only make it worse.
As Peter Shuck stated, in the context of illegal migrants
generally:
372.
See UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child-Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index-30229.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2005)
("Only two countries, Somalia and the United States, have not ratified this celebrated
agreement. Somalia is currently unable to proceed to ratification as it has no
recognized government. By signing the Convention, the United States has signaled its
intention to ratify-but has yet to do so.").
373.
See generally Shachar, supra note 5, at 367 (discussing citizenship-at-birth
allocation rules as the "wealth-preserving" function of citizenship).
374.
Cf. Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of
.Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389, 395 (2007) ("[It is both anti-democratic
and morally wrong in liberal terms to allow for treatment of a class of persons who are
living among us as social and political outsiders. Territorialism embodies an ethic of
inclusiveness and equality: it is the ground (both literally and figuratively) of national
community belonging."); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251, 268 ("Indeed, consent as a justification for political
obligation is least problematic in the case of immigrants."); David A. Martin,
Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INTL L. 278, 283 (1985)
("[A] secure citizenship status forms a basic foundation for the shaping of identity and
involvement in the polity.").
375.
See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in
Arizona Against Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff
Joseph Arpaio (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/May/12crt-602.html (discussing the contents of the complaint alleging that since 2006, the
Maricopa County Sherriff's Office and Sheriff Arpaio have "intentionally and
systematically discriminated against Latinos").
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[The] most important advantage [of a birthright citizenship rule] is
that it provides a crude but pragmatic accommodation to a longstanding, apparently intractable policy failure: the substantial
ineffectiveness of our border and interior immigration enforcement
programs. Our feckless enforcement policies have created a possibility,
indeed a certainty, that a large group of illegal aliens are nevertheless
long-term or even lifelong residents in the U.S. Without a birthright
citizenship rule or other amnesty, these illegals, their children, and
their children's children will continue to be outsiders mired in an
inferior and illegal status and deprived of the capacities of selfprotection and self-advancement. Whatever the disadvantages of
birthright citizenship, it has the great virtue of limiting the tragic
effects of this problem of inherited outlawry by confining illegal status
376
to a single generation for each family.

Perhaps one solution is a conditional path to citizenship based on
residency of children born in the United States who would otherwise
be stateless. The Birthright Citizenship Act does not espouse such a
plan, but it would be possible to provide a path to U.S. citizenship at
least for children who otherwise would not have a nationality, along
the lines of the "foundling" statute already on the books. The statute
provides that "a person of unknown parentage found in the United
States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his
attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the
United States" shall be a "national[] and citizen[ I of the United
States at birth."3 77 The statute could be amended to specify that "a
person of unknown nationality" shall be a U.S. citizen. Or, adopting a
more limited approach than that of the United Kingdom, the law
could provide for citizenship at the age of majority for children whose
nationality is not clear.
There are several problems with these proposals. For one, the
parents and child may not know there is any nationality problem at
all until it is too late to take advantage of statelessness provisions for
children. The parents may not know of or be able to accomplish birth
registration in their home country, or they may not be aware of other
laws of their home country restricting citizenship by descent.
Further, the parents' own nationality may be in doubt. Children born
in these situations may well reach adulthood before discovering the
nationality issue, and likely then only through a deportation
proceeding. The issue of citizenship is not likely to be apparent for
some time. This result would be grossly unfair to the child, as well as
costly to the nation.

376.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 27, at 77 (quoting Societal and Legal Issues
Surrounding ChildrenBorn in the United States to Illegal Alien Parents,Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Claims & Subcomm. on the Constitution, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 100 (1995) (statement of Peter H. Shuck))
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
377.
Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(f), ch. 1, 66 Stat. 163, 236 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f) (2006)).

510

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 46:443

Secondly, some administrative mechanism to determine claims
of statelessness would be required, assuming a parent is sufficiently
knowledgeable to identify the nationality problem. Applications to
establish statelessness would entail complicated factual and legal
issues, as the survey of nationality laws above indicates. Any
application could well expose the parents, if they are in the country
illegally, to deportation proceedings. Of course, determining who is
and who is not a citizen among persons living within the United
States is far easier under the existing birthright citizenship regime.
In contrast, under the proposed.Birthright Citizenship Act, the cost to
prove citizenship by U.S. parents has been estimated to range from
$1,200 to $1,600 per child, plus the cost of national identity cards for
all U.S. citizens.37 8
Thirdly, safeguards providing citizenship for stateless children
could well produce a moral hazard, with an incentive for parents to
hide or destroy proof of nationality in an attempt to create
statelessness-and hence U.S. citizenship-for their children. The
United States could criminalize those acts, as it does with respect to
the deportation process, but this type of fraud is often difficult to
detect and entails costly investigation. A similar moral hazard would
be present for all births to unauthorized migrants under the proposed
Birthright Citizenship Act-an incentive to produce fraudulent proof
of U.S. citizenship or legal permanent residence in order for the child
to receive U.S. citizenship at birth.
In addition, there must be some process to determine paternity
for U.S.-citizen fathers who are not married to the mother of a child.
For births overseas to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, the Immigration
and Nationality Act provides a complicated scheme to establish a
child's right to U.S. citizenship.3 79 The authors of the Birthright
Citizenship Act seem to have overlooked this issue and have not
provided any guidance on how to either weed out false claims of
paternity or verify true claims. Presumably, state law would govern
the determination of parentage. As a result, there would be fifty
different laws regarding the citizenship of a child when U.S.-citizen
fathers and noncitizen mothers are not married to each other.
There is potential for abuse and error by local officials, as well.
Localities typically issue birth certificates based on hospital records
(for those born in hospitals).3 8 0 One can imagine the administrative
difficulty of determining the nationality of the parents (e.g.,

378.
See Stock, supra note 287, at 1 ("[There is] a 'tax' of $1,200 to $1,600 on
each baby born in the United States.").
379.
See Immigration and Nationality Act § 309(a)(4) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2006)) (establishing the process for citizenship while the child is
under eighteen years of age).
As Margaret Stock has pointed out, the United States has no national
380.
registry of births, unlike many countries. See Stock, supra note 287, at 7.
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derivative U.S. citizenship, missing or nonexistent U.S. birth
certificates). As the discussion of deportation of U.S. citizens
indicates, it- is not always easy to determine U.S. citizenship. One
worry is that the local official would make assumptions based on the
race or ethnicity of the parent. This concern animates some of the
opposition to a proposal in several state legislatures that would
require the issuance of a different type of birth certificate to
undocumented parents. 381
In sum, the issues of existing statelessness in the United States
and the prospect of future generations of stateless children should be
of concern to all political parties. Stateless children born here would
constitute a far more formidable problem because this statelessness
can extend for generations and create an underclass that cannot be
deported. The undesirability of statelessness seems to be something
many can agree upon, including both proponents and opponents of
the Birthright Citizenship Act. However, this Article also takes the
position that a provision to award citizenship to children who
otherwise would not have a nationality is not a workable solution,
primarily because of the difficulties of administration, cost, and the
potential for error and abuse by both applicants and officials. The fair
and effective solution for the United States is to retain its tradition of
birthright citizenship.38 2

IV. CONCLUSION

This Article assesses existing statelessness in the United States
as well as the potential for increased statelessness if the U.S. law of
birthright citizenship is restricted. International agreements endorse
jus soli as the preferred mechanism to avoid statelessness. However,
a nearly universal jus soli in the Americas fails to resolve nationality
in significant instances, as evidenced by the existence of
undocumented persons within their states of origin and the inability

381.
See Marc Lacey, Birthright Citizenship Looms as Next Immigration Battle,
N.Y. TIMES, at Al (discussing the issue of pregnant immigrants alleged to enter the
United States in order to give birth).
382.
Although this Article has focused on the creation of statelessness as one
reason to oppose changing birthright citizenship in the United States, there are other
compelling reasons to retain it not addressed here. For an overview of some of these
reasons, see Stock, supra note 287, at 1. A leading alternative to jus soli and jus
sanguinis focuses upon generations rather than descent or residence, with members of
the third generation, the grandchildren of immigrants, automatically entitled to
citizenship at birth, while members of the second generation would be entitled to
citizenship after having resided in the country for a number of years. Foreign-born
children who immigrate at an early age would be entitled to citizenship after residing
in the country for ten years, or completing six years in school. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 79-80 (citing proposal by the Comparative Citizenship Project of the
Carnegies Endowment for International Peace and the Migration Policy Institute).
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of the United States to deport persons due to disputes over
nationality. In areas where migration is common, the prevention of
statelessness relies upon the careful recording of births and easy
access to those records, as well as the commitment of the country of
origin to accept, return, or render aid to its emigrants. Based on
historical migration patterns, it is significant for the United States
that the Western Hemisphere contains persons of uncertain
nationality-displaced or undocumented at birth, or both.
This Article does not attempt to engage the debate on theoretical
bases for citizenship,38 3 nor is its purpose to issue a normative call for
universal citizenship or residency privileges.3 84 Rather, it attempts to
offer a practical analysis of the various ways by which modification of
jus soli may create statelessness. The Article's contribution is to
detail the mechanisms
that would create
statelessness,
understanding that statelessness in the United States correlates with
political decisions about immigration law. Membership boundaries
can thus be examined in a larger sphere and with a more complete
view.
The Article calls attention to statelessness of two types: that of
persons born elsewhere but with no ability to prove citizenship and
that of future generations born in this country. The former is not
under U.S. control, absent fail-proof border security. The existence of
12 million undocumented aliens suggests that border control cannot
be fail-proof, or at least not at any affordable price. The latter-future
generations of the stateless, a more formidable problem-is under
U.S. control.
The evidence for existing statelessness emanates from two
sources: (1) a comparative look at statelessness elsewhere in the
Americas and its significance for the United States and (2) the
frequency of contested citizenship when the United States attempts
to deport undocumented persons. In turn, the prospect for stateless
children born in the United States is primarily caused by (1) birth to
a parent with no effective claim to a nationality and (2) generational,
residency, and other limitations in the citizenship rules of countries
with migrant populations in the United States.
The conclusions in this Article have potential for a broader
application. A 2010 article in the Journalof Law & Economics posits
that "when facing increasing immigration, countries with a jus soli

See generally PETER SPIRo, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY
383.
AFTER GLOBALIZATION (2008) (comparing several theories for obtaining citizenship).
See generally DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION
384.
AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP (1996) (proposing that current theories of political
sociology and international relations are rooted in conceptions that are of decreasing
relevance); Matthew Lister, Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV.
175 (2010) (articulating a "civic" notion of citizenship based on political values rather
than shared demographic).

2013/

STATELESS IN THE UNITED STA TES

513

regime tend to restrict their legislation, whereas countries with a jus
sanguinis regime resist innovation."3 85 The United States may yet
confirm this thesis. Canada also recently considered but rejected an
amendment limiting its birthright citizenship rules.38 6 On the other
hand, jus soli rules elsewhere in the Americas have remained
remarkably free from controversy, even in countries with significant
in-migration. Instead, changes in the rules that govern the
attribution of citizenship have tended to restrict jus sanguinis, rather
than limit jus soli. Latin American nations have favored increased
border control over changes to birthright citizenship law.38 7 The link
with border control-an important political issue in the United
States-should not be overlooked.
Questions of the uncertain nationality of some unauthorized
migrants would be far more difficult to resolve under a citizenship
scheme governed solely by descent. Given migration, displacement,
and poor administrative reach in rural areas and indigenous
communities in the Americas, it is in the domestic interest of the
United States for nations in this hemisphere to retain primary
reliance on jus soli to assign nationality at birth. The United States
should lead by example and seek solutions to perceived problems via
immigration reform and border control, rather than limitation of jus
soli. Citizenship, after all, has been described by Chief Justice Earl
Warren as "nothing less than the right to have rights."38 8

385.
Graziella Bertocchi & Chiara Strozzi, The Evolution of Citizenship:
Economic and InstitutionalDeterminants,53 J.L. & ECON. 95, 95 (2010).
386.
The proposal in Canada would have limited citizenship at birth in the
territory to children born to at least one parent who was a permanent resident or a
Canadian citizen. Importantly, this proposal included a provision for citizenship if a
child would otherwise be stateless, as well as for children born to refugees whose
claims were accepted. See Young, supra note 282, § B.
387.
See generally, e.g., STEPHEN JOHNSON, JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN &
KATHERINE BLISS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, POLICE REFORM IN LATIN
AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY (2012), available at http://csis.org/files/

publication/120228_JohnsonPoliceReformweb.pdf (discussing Latin American police
reforms, including border patrol).
388.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas,
JJ., dissenting).
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Appendix:
SOURCE: Office of Immigration Statistics, DHS 38 9
Country of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population*January 2009 and 2000
Average
annual
Percent
Estimated population in
change
change
Percent of total
January
2000 to 2009
2000 to 2009
2000
2009
2000
2009
Country
of birth
10,750,000

8,460,000

6,650,000

4,680,000

530,000

430,000

100

100

27

250,000

62

55

42

220,000

5

5

25

10,000

290,000

4

3

65

20,000

160,000

3

2

95

20,000

200,000

2

2

33

10,000

120,000

2

1

64

10.000

180,000

2

2

14

110,000

2

1

55

10,000

100,000

1

1

49

10,000

190,000

1

2

-37

(10,000)

2,000,000

15

24

-17

(40,000)

Allcountries
Mexic
El Salvador
480,000
Guatemala
320,000
Honduras
Phippie

270,000
2
200,0

India
200,000
Korea

-

170,000
Ecuador
150,000
Brazil
120,000
China
Other
muntries

1,650,000

- Represents less than 5,000. Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding.

389.

HOEFER, RYTINA, & BAKER, supra note 6, at 4.

